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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
DAVID SCHEFFER* & ASHLEY COX**
In the event that the United States considers ratifying the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), concerns will be raised
regarding whether such ratification and U.S. participation in the ICC
would comply with the U.S. Constitution. A primary issue is whether such
ratificationwould violate Article IIl, Section 1 of the Constitution regarding
the judicialpower of the United States. The authors argue that ratification
following adoption of implementing legislation would not violate Article III,
Section 1. The ratification strategy proposed in this Article would be
grounded in the Article II, Section 2 treatypower and the Article 1, Section
8, Clause 10 Define and Punish Clause of the Constitution, and include
amendments to the federal criminal code and military code to ensure the
ability of U.S. courts to investigate and prosecute the atrocity crimes
comprising the subject matterjurisdiction of the Rome Statute. The Article
confirms that fundamental due process rights are protected by the Rome
Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and that the absence of
jury trials before the ICC does not violate the Constitution. Nonetheless,
the complementarity regime of the Rome Statute enables the United States
to prosecute any American citizen or other individual within its jurisdiction
before a jury and in accordance with the full range of due process rights
guaranteed by the Constitution and American jurisprudence. The United
States would not be barred by the Constitutionfrom agreeing to the Rome
Statute's prohibition of head of state or other high-level immunity from
prosecution before the ICC. The authors propose a ratification strategy
. David Scheffer is the Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and Director
of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law. He
is a member of the New York, District of Columbia, and Supreme Court Bars and is a former
U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (1997-2001).
.. Ashley Cox is an associate at Kirkland & Ellis LLP in Chicago, Illinois. She is a
member of the Illinois bar. The views expressed herein are personal and do not reflect those
of Kirkland & Ellis LLP. All errors, if any, are her own.
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that includes adoption of declarations, understandings, and provisos to
clarify American adherence to its Constitutionas a State Party to the Rome
Statute.
A decade has elapsed since the final text of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) 1 was approved at the conclusion of a
diplomatic conference in Rome, Italy.2 Legal scholars have written a great
deal since then about whether or not the Rome Statute would meet U.S.
constitutional requirements if the United States were to become a State
Party to it. 3 Despite the American opposition to the ICC during the Bush
Administration (2001-2009), 4 there remains the possibility that in the future
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force on July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute], availableat http://www.icccpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/RomeStatuteEnglish.pdf.
2 Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Dissents, but Accord Is Reached on War Crimes Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1998, at Al.
3 See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, The United States of America and the International
CriminalCourt, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (2002); John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses
of the International Criminal Court From America's Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 167 (2001); Brett W. Johnson, The Future ConstitutionalBattle if the United States
Ratifies the InternationalCriminal Court Treaty, 3 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L 1 (2003),
http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/spring2003.html; Monroe Leigh, Editorial Comment, The
United States and the Statute of Rome, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 124 (2001); Ruth Wedgwood, The
Constitution and the ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
119 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kesen eds., 2000); Audrey I. Benison, Note, International
Criminal Tribunals: Is There a Substantive Limitation on the Treaty Power?, 37 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 75 (2001); see also Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality
of an International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 101-35 (1995)
(discussing constitutionality under U.S. law of a prospective ICC statute).
4 See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Sec'y of State, Reflections on
Transatlantic Approaches to International Law, Speech at the Duke University School of
Law Center for International and Comparative Law (Nov. 15, 2006), in 17 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 513, 520 (2007) ("Embracing the Rome Statute in spite of our serious concerns
could only reflect a cavalier attitude towards the Court and international law more
generally."); John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Sec'y of State, The United
States and the International Criminal Court: Where We've Been and Where We're Going,
Remarks to the DePaul University College of Law (Apr. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/rls/l04053.htm [hereinafter Bellinger Remarks] ("The core
concerns of the United States about the Rome Statute have not been resolved during the past
decade, and are unlikely to be resolved in the next decade, unless the Statute is changed.
Accordingly, as we look forward, the United States will very likely remain outside the Rome
Statute regime. This is a reality that ICC supporters should accept."); News Release, Senior
Defense Official, Department of Defense, Background Briefing on the International Criminal
Court
(July
2,
2002),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts
/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3528 ("In the Prosecutions [of an American by the ICC],
Americans would not be entitled to all of the protections that our Constitution affords to
Americans in criminal prosecutions ... the added risks created by the ICC necessitate our
withdrawing the U.S. peacekeepers from the East Timor mission."); News Release,
Department of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC Treaty (May 6, 2002),
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a new Presidential administration and the Senate, with support from the
House of Representatives, will find reason to seriously consider ratification
of the Rome Statute. 5 If that were to occur, we believe the constitutional
issues that undoubtedly would be raised require careful examination. In
this Article we hope to demonstrate *that concerns about compliance with
the U.S. Constitution were the United States to ratify the Rome Statute are
largely without merit. 6 Where there may be some residual difficulties on
the constitutional front, we offer suggestions for how to accommodate
particular concerns through U.S. legislation and with U.S. declarations,
understandings, and provisos to the Rome Statute as part of the ratification
process.7
("Earlier
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3337
today, this administration announced the president's decision to formally notify the United
Nations that the United States will not become a party to [sic] International Criminal Court
treaty. The U.S. declaration, which was delivered to the secretary general this morning,
effectively reverses the previous U.S. government decision to become a signatory."); Marc
Grossman, Under Sec'y for Political Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov
/p/us/rm/9949.htm ("In order to make our objections clear, both in principle and philosophy,
and so as not to create unwarranted expectations of U.S. involvement in the Court, the
President believes that he has no choice but to inform the United Nations, as depository of
the treaty, of our intention not to become a party to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.").
5 See generally KELLY WHITLEY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT COAL. & NORTHWESTERN
UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW CTR. FOR INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AMERICA'S NEW PRIORITIES (2008), available at

http://www.cfr.org/publication/5802/northwestern-university-school-of-jaw.html; John P.
Cerone, Dynamic Equilibrium: The Evolution of US Attitudes toward InternationalCriminal
Courts and Tribunals, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 277, 315 (2007); Jose Alvarez, The Evolving U.S.ICC Relationship: Notes from the President, 24 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. NEWSL. 1 (2008),
availableat http://www.asil.org/newsletter/president/pres080320.html.
6 We follow in the footsteps of such legal scholars as Professor Ruth Wedgwood, who in
2000 wrote, "The ICC is a new creation in international jurisprudence, and thus, one should
not expect cut-and-dried precedent on the matter. But the most persuasive answer is that
there is no forbidding constitutional obstacle to U.S. participation in the treaty." Wedgwood,
supra note 3, at 121.
7 We acknowledge at the outset that one of the authors of this Article, David Scheffer,
was the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues from 1997 to 2001, was deputy
head of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. talks on the ICC from 1995 to 1997, and was head of
the U.S. delegation to the Rome talks from August 1997 to January 2001. He signed the
Rome Statute on behalf of the United States of America on December 31, 2000. Steven Lee
Meyers, U.S. Signs Treaty for World Court to Try Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at
Al. Since then, he has written a considerable number of articles explaining, inter alia, what
transpired during the years of negotiation, and why the United States should move towards a
posture of cooperation with, and ultimately State Party status to, the International Criminal
Court. See David Scheffer & John Hutson, Strategy for U.S. Engagement with the
International Criminal Court, CENTURY FOUNDATION (2008), available at
http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=TP&topic=8A; David Scheffer, Review of the Experiences
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This Article addresses nine areas of inquiry into the Rome Statute and
U.S. constitutional law. Part I provides relevant background on the Rome
Statute and American policy on the ICC as a predicate to the more focused
discussion on constitutional issues. Part II explains the significance of the
Rome Statute's complementarity doctrine, which offers the United States

of the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers of the InternationalCriminal Court Regarding the
Disclosureof Evidence, 21 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 151 (2008); The US and the International
Criminal Court Then andNow, JURIST, July 15, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/
2008/07/us-and-intemational-criminal-court.php; Introductory Note to Decision on the
Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute in the Case of the Prosecutorv.
Ahmad Muhammad Harun (Ahmad Harun) and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali
Kushayb) ICC Pre-TrialChamberI, in 46 I.L.M. 532 (2007); David Scheffer et al., The End
of Exceptionalism in War Crimes, HARV. INT'L REV., Nov. 21,
2007,
http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1 647/; David Scheffer, Jostling Over Justice, 154 FOREIGN
POL'Y 4 (2006); Advancing U.S. Interests with the International Criminal Court, Address at
the Vanderbilt University Law School (Mar. 27, 2003), in 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1567
(2003); Restoring U.S. Engagement with the International Criminal Court, 21 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 599 (2003); Should the United States Join the International Criminal Court?,
Presentation at the University of California at Davis Journal of International Law and Policy
Symposium: An Emerging International Criminal Justice System: Milosevic, Killing Fields,
and "Kangaroo" Courts (Apr. 22, 2002), in 9 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 45 (2002);

Staying the Course with the InternationalCriminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47 (2002);
The Future of Atrocity Law, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 389 (2002); A Negotiator's

Perspective on the International Criminal Court, Fourteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in
InternationalLaw delivered at the Judge Advocate General's School (Feb. 28, 2001), in 167
MIL. L. REV. 1 (2001); Correspondence, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 624 (2001) (discussing
International Criminal Court negotiations); Opening Address at the New England Law
Review Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects (Nov. 3, 2001),
in 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 233 (2001); The International Criminal Court, in ABA
CONFERENCE ON THE UN DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS & THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 88

(American Bar Association, 2001); The International Criminal Court: The Challenge of
Jurisdiction,93 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 65 (2000); The U.S. Perspective on the ICC, in
THE UNITED STATES & THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 115 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl

Kaysen eds. 2000); The United States and the InternationalCriminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 12 (1999); The U.S. Perspective on the International Criminal Court, Comments at the
McGill Law Journal International Conference: Hate, Genocide and Human Rights Fifty
Years Later: What Have We Learned? What Must We Do? (Jan. 28, 1999), in 46 McGILL
L.J. 269 (2000); U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, Remarks at the Comell
International Law Journal Symposium: The International Criminal Court: Consensus and
Debate on the International Adjudication of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War
Crimes, and Aggression (Mar. 5, 1999), in 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 529 (1999). Constitutional
issues were constantly considered by the U.S. delegation during the years of negotiations
stretching from 1995 to 2001. U.S. Department of Justice career attorneys, particularly from
the Criminal Division, actively participated on the U.S. delegation and deeply influenced the
negotiations leading to the text of the Rome Statute concluded in July 1998, and the
negotiations leading to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, concluded in June 2000. That
experience, along with contemporary research and reflection on the issues, informs this
Article.
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the first opportunity to investigate any U.S. citizen who may become an
ICC target, and by so doing require the ICC to refrain from exercising
jurisdiction. Under such circumstances, a U.S. citizen would be prosecuted
pursuant to U.S. law and all of the protections afforded by the Constitution.
Part III examines whether an Article III court is the only constitutionally
valid forum within which to prosecute an American citizen for a criminal
act falling within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC. Part IV
addresses whether the United States can use the Article II treaty power to
enter into treaties that provide for extradition of American citizens to
foreign courts. Part V explores whether the "define and punish" power of
Congress allows the United States to participate in the ICC. Part VI focuses
on whether the ICC's denial of any constitutionally-protected due process
rights, particularly trial by jury, introduces an insurmountable constitutional
obstacle to U.S. participation in the ICC. Part VII discusses whether the
due process rights afforded by the ICC could withstand Supreme Court
review with respect to any American citizen prosecuted by the ICC. Part
VIII examines whether official immunities would be a bar to U.S.
compliance with Article 27 of the Rome Statute. Finally, Part IX
recommends concrete steps that could be taken now and in the future to
ease remaining concerns about the constitutionality of the Rome Statute.
The Conclusion summarizes some of the major points made in this Article.
I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND AMERICAN POLICY
The International Criminal Court is the first permanent judicial body
that seeks universal participation by nations in its objective to bring leading
perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, serious war crimes, and
aggression, together known as "atrocity crimes,', 8 to justice. During the last
fifteen years, international courts have advanced international criminal
justice in regional contexts and within the narrow jurisdictional mandates of
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)9 and
Rwanda (ICTR), l0 the Special Court for Sierra Leone,11 the Extraordinary
David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, 1 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 229
(2006); David Scheffer, The Merits of Unifying Terms: "Atrocity Crimes" and "Atrocity
Law," 2 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 91 (2007).
9 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Home
Page, http://www.un.org/icty/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
10 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between 1 January 1994 and
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Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 12 and war crimes courts in BosniaHerzegovina, 13 Kosovo, 14 and Timor-Leste. 15 While those tribunals were
31 December 1994, Annex to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doe. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Home Page,
http://www.ictr.org (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
i Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/scslagreement.html; and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 145, 17, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.html; see also
S.C. Res. 1370, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1370 (Sept. 18, 2001) (encouraging the Secretary-General,
the government of Sierra Leone, and others involved "to expedite the establishment
of... the Special Court envisaged by Resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000"); S.C.
Res. 1315 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (requesting that the UN Secretary
General issue a report concerning the establishment of a special court in order to prosecute
perpetrators in Sierra Leone); Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) (delineating the legal
framework and requisite administrative elements for the establishment of a Sierra Leonean
special court and setting forth in the Annex thereto the Agreement between the United
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for
Sierra Leone, and in the Enclosure thereto the proposed text of the Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE (2006) (examining

attributes of the Special Court for Sierra Leone); Avril D. Haines, Accountability in Sierra
Leone: the Role of the Special Court, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL

RESPONSES

173-326

(Jane

E.

Stromseth

ed.,

2003)

[hereinafter

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES].

12Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, NS/RKM1004/006 (2006)
(Cambodia), available at http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/CTM/DomesticCambodian
Law as amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf; Agreement between the U.N. and the Royal
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes
Committed
During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, available at
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/CTM/Agreement-between UN-andRGC.pdf;
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english
/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2008). See David Scheffer, The ExtraordinaryChambers
in the Courts of Cambodia, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,

2008).
13 The Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina Home Page, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?jezik=e
(last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
14 United Nations Mission in Kosovo Home Page, http://www.unmikonline.org/
(last
visited Aug. 5, 2008).
15 See U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor 1, U.N. Doc.
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor
/untaetR/Reg00l5E.pdf (establishing a special panel of judges to address serious criminal
offences committed in East Timor); see also Laura A. Dickinson, The Dance of
Complementarity: Relationships Among Domestic, International, and Transnational
Accountability Mechanisms in East Timor and Indonesia, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR

ATROCITIES, supra note 11, at 319 (examining the evolution of accountability and
reconciliation mechanisms in East Timor and Indonesia in the aftermath of the September
1999 massacres in East Timor); Suzannah Linton, Risingfrom the Ashes: the Creation of a
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evolving, the international community embraced the idea of a permanent
criminal court that in most respects would obviate the need for the timeconsuming and costly creation of specialized international or hybrid (part
national, part international) courts for individual atrocity situations as they
erupt anywhere in the world. Although the United Nations Security
Council had created and empowered the ICTY and ICTR under the U.N.
Charter's Chapter VII enforcement authority,1 6 the only way a permanent
court with broad jurisdiction would be established was through the treaty
process whereby sovereign nations consented to the investigation and
prosecution, under certain circumstances, of their own nationals before a
global court of criminal law.
Because criminal prosecutions are
traditionally a national prerogative, this would be no easy task to
accomplish on an international platform.
But after years of work by the U.N. International Law Commission17
and further drafting and intensive negotiations among governments under
U.N. auspices,1 8 the text of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court was approved on July 17, 1998.19 The U.S. delegation to the U.N.
talks contributed significantly to the provisions of the Rome Statute,

Viable CriminalJustice System in East Timor, 25 MELB. U. L. REv. 122 (2001) (describing
the September 1999 massacres, conflict that followed, and the establishment of a criminal
law system, including a process for prosecuting atrocity crimes).
16ICTR Statute, supra note 10 (establishing an international tribunal for Rwanda and
adopting the statute of the tribunal); ICTY Statute, supra note 9 (establishing an international
tribunal for prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991).
17 Int'l Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (May 2-July 22, 1994) (containing final draft statute for an
international criminal court approved by the International Law Commission in 1994); see
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 8-11 (3d
ed. 2007) ("The International Law Commission's draft statute of 1994 focused on procedural
and organizational matters, leaving the question of defining the crimes and the associated
legal principles to the code of crimes, which it had yet to complete.").
18 Preparatory Comm'n on the Establishment of an Int'l Crim. Ct., Introduction & Draft
Organization of Work, A/Conf.183/2 (1998); Preparatory Comm'n on the Establishment of
an Int'l Crim. Ct., Draft Statute & Draft FinalAct, A/Conf. 183/2/Add. I (1998); Preparatory
Comm'n on the Establishment of an Int'l Crim. Ct., Draft Rules of Procedure,
A/Conf.183/2/Add.2 (1998); Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting From January 19-30,
1998 held in Zutphen, The Netherlands, A/AC.249/1998/L. 13 (1998); Preparatory Comm'n
on the Establishment of an Int'l Crim. Ct., Decisions Taken at its Session held in New York
December 1-12, 1997, A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1 (1997); Preparatory Comm'n on the
Establishment of an Int'l Crim. Ct., Decisions Taken at its Session held in New York August
4-15, 1997, A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev. I (1997); Preparatory Comm'n on the Establishment of
an Int'l Crim. Ct., Decisions Taken at its Session held in New York February 11-21, 1997,
A/AC,249/1997/L.5, 1997 (1997).
19 SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 15-21; Stanley, supranote 2.
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including its due process requirements, and it was the hope of the Clinton
Administration to join consensus on the final text in Rome.2 ° But a few
major issues were not satisfactorily addressed, 2' and the U.S. delegation
was instructed by Washington to vote against the final text, becoming one
of very few nations to do so. 2 2 Nonetheless, over the next two years the
United States actively participated in further negotiations on the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of Crime for the ICC. 23 Both of
these documents, upon which the U.S. delegation had insisted in Rome and
to which the delegation had made major contributions, such as preparing
the first draft of the Elements of Crimes and leading negotiations
thereafter,24 were adopted by consensus, joined by the United States, in
June 2000.25

Following two years of multilateral negotiations on many of the
supplemental agreements required by the Rome Statute, President Bill
Clinton decided that the United States would join with 137 other
governments and sign the Treaty on December 31, 2000, the last possible
day for any nation to sign the document.26 Some important issues on the
American agenda for the ICC still remained unresolved, but the U.S.
delegation prepared the groundwork for negotiation of those issues in
continued U.N. talks on the supplemental agreements in 2001. The
incoming Bush Administration chose to abandon the U.N. talks altogether,
and those opportunities to address U.S. concerns were lost. On May 6,
20 Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, supra note 7, at
68-72; Scheffer, The United States and the InternationalCriminal Court, supra note 7, at 17.
21 Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest? Hearing Before

the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong.
10, 12-15 (1998) (statement of David Scheffer) [hereinafter 1998 Senate Hearing]; Scheffer,
Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, supra note 7, at 77-86; Scheffer,
The United States and the International Criminal Court,supra note 7, at 17-21.
22 SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 20-21 ("The result [of the vote] was 120 in favour, with
twenty-one abstentions and seven votes against .... The United States, Israel and China
stated that they had opposed adoption of the statute.").
23 Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, supra note 7, at
74-86.
24 William K. Lietzau, Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof: StructuralPillars
for the InternationalCriminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 477, 478-84 (1999).
25 Barbara Crossette, U.S. Gains Compromise on a War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2000, at A6.
26 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 125(1) (providing for December 31, 2000, as the last
day any State may sign the Rome Statute-and thereafter ratify, accept, or approve the treaty
to become a State Party to it; after December 31, 2000, a non-signatory State would have to
accede to the treaty in order to become a State Party to it); William J. Clinton, Clinton's
Words: 'The Right Action,' N.Y. TIMES, January 1, 2001, at A6 (reprinted statement on the
treaty signing) [hereinafter Clinton Statement]; Steven Lee Meyer, U.S. Signs Treaty for
World Court to Try Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at Al.

2008]

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ROME STATUTE

991

2002, President George W. Bush rendered inactive the U.S. signature on the
Treaty by informing the United Nations, as depository of the Treaty, that
the United States would no longer honor the obligations of a signatory
nation.2 7 Shortly thereafter, Congress adopted and President Bush signed
into law the American Service Members Protection Act,28 which is a blunt
anti-ICC piece of legislation designed to prohibit any U.S. cooperation with
the ICC and to punish nations that join it.29 By late 2007, however,
Congress repealed some of the punitive measures of the law following years
of sharp deterioration in U.S. military and diplomatic relations with nations
that defied the Bush Administration and joined the ICC anyway.30
As of October 1, 2008, there will be 108 State Parties to the Rome
Statute. 31 These include almost every major ally of the United States, many
nations that are considered friends, and none that are characterized as evil,
Communist, or adversarial. They consist of all but one of the European
Union nations, Canada, Mexico, most of Latin America and the Caribbean,
a majority of African countries, and sixteen Asia-Pacific nations, including
Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.32 The ICC has accepted four
atrocity crimes situations for investigation and prosecution and issued
indictments in most of them: the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

27 Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Rejects All Support for a New Court on Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES,

May 7, 2002, at A11; Letter from John R. Bolton, Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, to Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General (May 6, 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm). Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, which the United States regards as reflecting customary international
law, specifies that "[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty when... it has signed the treaty... until it shall have made its
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty. . . ." Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties, art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; U.S. Department of State, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last
visited Aug. 5, 2008) (explaining that although the United States is not a party to the Vienna
Convention, the United States signed it on April 24, 1970, and "considers many of the
provisions.., to constitute customary international law.").
28 U.S.C. §§ 7421-33 (2006).
29Lillian V. Faulhaber, American Service Members Protection Act of 2002, 40 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 537 (2003).
30 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. 109-

364, § 1210, 120 Stat. 2083 (amending the American Service-Members' Protection Act to
remove International Military Education and Training (IMET) restrictions); National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 110-181, § 1212, 122 Stat. 3
(amending the American Service-Members' Protection Act to eliminate restrictions on
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance laws).
31 International Criminal Court: The State Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icccpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
32 Id.
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regarding which arrests have been made and pre-trial
proceedings
are
36
35
underway, 33 Uganda, 34 the Central African Republic, and Darfur.
The Rome Statute reflects the convergence of the common law and
civil law systems, varying nation by nation, that constitute the global
administration of criminal law.37 Most of the world is governed by some
variation of civil law. Only a relatively small number of nations employ the
common law system. 38 Consequently, few countries use the jury system in
their criminal trials; 39 the vast majority of nations rely on judges ruling from
the bench. During the negotiations leading to the Rome Statute and, in
particular, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,4 ° there was constant
attention to this melding exercise of civil and common law systems as well
as acknowledgement of other major bodies of law in the world. It is
inconceivable that the vast majority of nations negotiating the Rome Statute
would have accepted a requirement of trial by jury. Indeed, the very nature
of the exercise-to prosecute the masterminds of complex and massive
atrocity crimes before an international court in The Hague-was
incompatible with the jury system. Who exactly would be the members of
the jury from the global society? How would they be selected when so
many nations are invested in the process? What educational level would be
required of jury members? Negotiators focused on a procedure that would
select highly qualified judges conversant in national criminal law and
international criminal law and skilled in parsing through the complex
evidence that is characteristic of atrocity crimes, particularly when handling

33 International Criminal Court: Democratic Republic of the Congo, http://www.icccpi.int/cases/RDC.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
34 International Criminal Court: Uganda, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/UGD.html (last
visited Aug. 5, 2008).
35 International Criminal Court: Central African Republic, http://www.icccpi.int/cases/RCA.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
36International Criminal Court: Darfur, Sudan, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/Darfur.html
(last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
37 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 353-77 (2d. ed. 2008); SCHABAS,
supra note 17, at 1-25.
38 See, e.g., William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions:Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified
and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 684 (1999).
39 These include: Canada, the United States, Belgium, Greece, Gibraltar, Australia,
Austria, England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Japan will introduce jury trials in
2009. For an overview of this development in Japan, see Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth of
Japan's Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems: A Cross-National Analysis of Legal
Consciousness and the Lay ParticipatoryExperience in Japan and the U.S., 40 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 315 (2007).
40 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/l/3 (September 9, 2002), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/OfficialJournal.html.
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prosecutions of those in leadership roles. 41 The ruling of judges on guilt or
innocence was considered vastly fairer to the defendant in such high-profile
international criminal trials than a likely problematic ruling by a group of
diverse individuals who may harbor prejudices, speak different languages
and dialects, hail from many countries, have vastly different levels of
educational achievement, and yet hold the fate of an alleged war criminal,
probably of a different nationality, in their hands.4 2 It would have been very
difficult for advocates of the jury system to take the leap from a jury of
peers drawn from one's own community or nation to a jury comprised of
foreigners who likely have little or no knowledge of the national context
within which the defendant operated or of the law under which he or she is
to be judged. Highly qualified judges can address both the national context
and the law, as the existing international and hybrid criminal tribunals have
demonstrated for years.
The Rome Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence and
Elements of Crimes have been in force since July 1, 2002, when the
required sixty nations ratified the Rome Statute and became State Parties to
it. 43 While genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are defined
and can be prosecuted by the ICC, 44 the crime of aggression is included, but
45
remains undefined and without any procedure for referral to the ICC.
Aggression thus cannot be investigated or prosecuted until the crime is
defined, the trigger mechanism for its consideration by the Court is agreed
to, and the Rome Statute is amended to include a definition and trigger
mechanism. The first review conference of the Rome Statute by the State
Parties, scheduled for 2010, should have before it one or more proposals for
such an amendment to "activate" the crime of aggression.46
Cases come before the ICC within the context of referrals of
"situations" of atrocity crimes, namely, large-scale and multiple
41 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 36(3)(b) (requiring selection of judges who have
established competence either in criminal law and procedure or "relevant areas of
international law such as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and
extensive experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the judicial
work of the Court").
42 For general discussion about the inquisitorial and adversarial systems of justice and
use of judges and juries, see CASSESE, supra note 37, at 357-74, 441; SCHABAS, supra note
17, at 205-10.
43 See Reuters, Countries That Ratified New Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.12, 2002,
at A3; Barbara Crossette, War Crimes Tribunal Becomes Reality, Without U.S. Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at A3; Marlise Simons, Without Fanfareor Cases, InternationalCourt
Sets Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at A3.
44 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5-8.
41 Id. art. 5.

46 International Criminal Court: Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/aspaggression.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
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commission of such crimes within a particular event, such as the conflict
between the Lord's Resistance Army and the Ugandan Army, the ethnic
cleansing against African tribes in the Darfur region of Sudan, the
bloodletting in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or
the mass rapes in the Central African Republic.4 7 A situation involving
alleged atrocity crimes can be referred to the ICC by a State Party to the
Rome Statute, by the U.N. Security Council using its U.N. Charter Chapter
VII enforcement authority, or by the ICC Prosecutor acting independently,
but only following approval by the Pre-Trial Chamber.4 8 Once a situation
has been referred to the ICC and it clears procedural hurdles for active
investigation, the Prosecutor acts independently to investigate individuals
who are suspected perpetrators of the atrocity crimes at issue. Then, the
Prosecutor may seek judicial approval of arrest warrants against particular
persons.49
The ICC is not a court of universal jurisdiction that can prosecute
anyone who has committed an atrocity crime anywhere in the world.5 °
There are usually certain preconditions to personal jurisdiction: the
individual charged with atrocity crimes must be a national of a State Party
to the ICC, or the territory on which the crime was committed must belong
to a State Party to the ICC. 51 If the Security Council refers the situation to
the ICC, however, these preconditions do not apply: a national of a nonparty State may be prosecuted, and the crimes need not be committed on the
territory of a State Party. Finally, a non-party State may file a declaration
with the ICC inviting it to investigate a situation in which the crimes
occurred in its territory or one or more of its nationals are suspected of
having perpetrated such crimes.52
The admissibility of individual cases, both potential and existing, is
governed by Articles 17-19 of the Rome Statute, and these are discussed in
greater detail in Part II below. The admissibility tests are critical to any
understanding of the constitutionality of the Rome Statute in American
practice for they invite national courts to handle cases under their national
criminal law, thus preempting the ICC's jurisdiction over a suspect.53 As
47 International Criminal Court: Situations and Cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html

(last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
48 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 13-15.
"9 Id. arts. 15, 53, 54, 58.
50 CASSESE, supra note 37, at 338; SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 67-85; ALEXANDER ZAHAR
& GORAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 446-503 (2008); Scheffer, Staying the
Course with the InternationalCriminal Court, supra note 7, at 65.
51 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12.
52 Id. art. 12(3).

53 SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 171-93; David Scheffer, Staying the Course with the
InternationalCriminalCourt, supra note 7, at 52-63, 87-89.
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explained below, concerns, as ill-founded as they likely would be, about the
protection of a U.S. national's constitutional due process rights before the
ICC need never arise if U.S. prosecutors and courts simply take the
initiative to investigate and, if merited, prosecute the U.S. national before a
U.S. court. Indeed, they have within their power the ability to guarantee a
jury trial.
Provided U.S. judicial authorities act with foresight and
professional objectivity, and provided federal criminal law is amended to
fully cover atrocity crimes, 54 there should be no reason for the ICC to
determine that the United States is, following the language of the Rome
Statute, either "unwilling or unable genuinely" to carry out an investigation
or prosecution of a suspect, thus entitling the ICC to find the case
admissible and to seek custody of the suspect.5 5 This feature of the Rome
Statute reflects the overriding presumption in the negotiations that the ICC
would focus its attention on situations where national legal systems are
devastated, perhaps practically nonexistent, in the wake of conflict and
atrocities or where cynical governments, perhaps implicated in the horrors,
show no ability to bring their own perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice.
As it happens, three of the four situations currently before the ICC are selfreferrals, made by governments that decided to refer internal atrocity
situations to the ICC because of inadequate domestic legal capabilities, or
for political reasons, to confront rebel movements head-on with
international justice.56
Part 3 of the Rome Statute sets forth general principles of criminal law
drawn from both common law and civil law traditions. These principles,
however, will look very familiar to American attorneys and judges, as a
U.S. delegation that included Justice Department Criminal Division lawyers
oversaw the drafting and adoption of the principles. The concerns the
United States had with the Rome Statute on July 17, 1998, 57 or when
54 See discussion, infra Part IV(D), on amending federal law.

55 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a).
56 Payam Akhavam, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the
First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 409-11

(2005); Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the
InternationalCriminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 385, 391-99 (2005).
57 Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, supra note 7, at
74-87 (noting that these concerns included under Article 12, the preconditions to jurisdiction
and how they might expose the United States as a non-State Party to the Court's jurisdiction;
under Article 124, the exposure of a non-party State to war crimes charges even though a
State Party could opt out of such a risk for seven years; under Article 121(5), the right of a
State Party to opt out of a new or amended crime, but the implicit exposure of a non-party
State to the new or amended crime; under Article 15, the ability of the Prosecutor to selfinitiate investigations; under Article 5, the inclusion of an undefined crime of aggression, the
prospect under Resolution E to the Rome Statute and Article 123 of the future inclusion of
crimes of terrorism and drug crimes; under Article 120, the prohibition on any reservations
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President Clinton pointed to some remaining flaws at the time of the
nothing to do with Part 3
signing of the treaty on December 31, 2000,58 had
issues. 59

or, for that matter, with any due process
The Rome Statute's general principles of criminal law include nullum
crimen sine lege;60 nulla poena sine lege;6 1 non-retroactivity ratione
personae;6 2 individual criminal responsibility, including aiding and abetting
and joint criminal enterprise; 63 the exclusion of jurisdiction over persons
under eighteen years of age; 64 the irrelevance of official capacity when
applying the Rome Statute; 65 the responsibility of commanders and other
superiors; 66 the non-applicability of statutes of limitations; 67 intent and
knowledge, or the mental element; 68 grounds for excluding criminal
responsibility; 69 mistake of fact or of law;7 ° and the defense of superior
orders and prescription of law. 7'
Procedural requirements for the investigation and prosecution of
suspects are set forth in Articles 53-61 of the Rome Statute,72 and the
principles governing ICC trials are detailed in Articles 62-76. 7 1 Rules 104to the Rome Statute; and under Article 8(2)(b)(vii), the precise definition of a war crime
covering an Occupying Power transferring its own population, directly or indirectly, into the
territory it occupies); see also David Scheffer, The United States and the International
Criminal Court, supra note 7, at 17-21 (describing U.S. concerns about the Rome Statute
during the Rome Conference of June-July 1998).
58 Clinton Statement, supra note 26; see also Scheffer, Staying the Course with the
International Criminal Court, supra note 7, at 63-68 (explaining the reasoning behind
President Clinton's signing statement of December 31, 2000).
59 1998 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 15; Scheffer, Staying the Course with the
International Criminal Court, supra note 7, at 73; Scheffer, The United States and the
InternationalCriminal Court,supra note 7, at 12, 17.
60 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22(1) ("A person shall not be criminally responsible
under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.").
61 Id. art. 23 ("A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with
this Statute.").
62 Id. art. 24(1) ("No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct
prior to the entry into force of the Statute.").
63 Id. art. 25.
64 Id. art. 26.
65 Id. art. 27.
66 Id. art. 28.
67 Id. art. 29.
68 Id. art. 30.
69 Id. art. 31.
70 Id. art. 32.

"' Id. art. 33.
72 SCHABAS,

supra note 17, at 235-84.

" Id. at 285-311.
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144 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence amplify the Rome Statute's
provisions.74 Part VII below examines the due process requirements of
particular relevance to the U.S. Constitution and how the Rome Statute and
Rules of Procedure and Evidence enforce those requirements. The
sentencing provisions of the Rome Statute do not permit the death penalty,75
which might have attracted troublesome scrutiny under constitutional law if
it had been included as a sentencing option.76
Recently there has been reason to believe that the United States is
shifting away from outright and punitive opposition to the ICC and towards
a more constructive dialogue about the Court.77 If that trend continues,
particularly following the election of a new president in November 2008,
then there should be some practical value in examining the issues set forth
in this Article.
II. THE COMPLEMENTARITY AND ARTICLE 98(2) FIREWALLS

During the U.N. negotiations leading to the Rome Statute,
governments gravitated towards a fundamental procedure that would permit
national courts the initial opportunity to investigate individuals within their
jurisdiction who are actual or potential targets of ICC investigation. 78
74 Hakan Friman, Investigation and Prosecution, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT 491,494-512, 515-38 (Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 2001); 2 Olivier Fourmy, Powers of the
Pre-Trial Chambers, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY, 1207, 1208 & 1215-28 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); 2 Guiliano
Turone, Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor,in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra, at 1137, 1148 & 1140-80; 2 Salvatore Zappala,
Right of Persons During an Investigation, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, Supra, 1181,1181-83 & 1195-1202.
75 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 77.
76 It would be a political non-starter for U.S. ratification purposes to expose American
defendants before the ICC to the risk of a maximum sentence of death by execution, which is
not possible under the Rome Statute anyway and cannot conceivably become one given the
abolitionist policies of a large number of the State Parties towards the death penalty. For a
discussion of the death penalty in the context of international extradition law and how the
United States has addressed it in that context, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 621-38 (5th ed. 2007).
77 Bellinger Remarks, supra note 4; WHITLEY, supra note 5; The American NonGovernmental Organization Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Statements of the
U.S. Presidential Candidates on the International Criminal Court, http://www.amicc.org/docs
/2008 Candidates on ICC.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
78 SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 174-86; lain Cameron, Jurisdiction and Admissibility
Issues Under the ICC Statute, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL
AND POLICY ISSUES 86 (Dominic McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004); Frederik Harhoff & Phakiso
Mochochoko, International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 664 (Roy
S. Lee et al. eds., 2001); 1 John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the
ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY,
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Initially, this procedure was articulated as one of admissibility on a case-bycase basis. Articles 17 and 19 of the Rome Statute set forth the procedures
for challenging the admissibility of an individual case already before the
ICC and the determinations the ICC must make in order to overcome a
challenge by a State, an accused, or a person for whom a warrant of arrest
or a summons to appear has been issued under Article 58. The primary
criteria to sustain the inadmissibility of a case before the ICC are set forth
in Article 17 and center on whether the State concerned is investigating or
prosecuting the case over which it has jurisdiction. 79 If that State is found
to be "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution," then the ICC may reach the decision to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the individual. 80
Non-party States are fully entitled to take advantage of the
complementarity procedures to avoid the prosecution by the ICC of their
nationals, who may be charged with commission of atrocity crimes on the
territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute. 81 If the non-party State fails
to act at all, or is unwilling to act, or is genuinely unable to act and thus
fails the admissibility test, any attempt by the ICC to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the non-party State national nonetheless will be highly
problematic and depend on the location of the individual. Jurisdiction will
depend on whether he or she is in custody in a State Party jurisdiction;82
ICC;
whether the Security Council has referred the entire situation to the
83
and whether the non-party State has consented to ICC jurisdiction.
Before the admissibility of a particular case even arises as an issue
before the ICC, a nation has the opportunity to seize full jurisdiction over
any cases that might attract ICC interest in a situation under investigation
by the Court pursuant to a State Party referral or an investigation initiated
by the Prosecutor. This preliminary procedure originally was introduced to
supra note 74, at 671-84; 1 Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditionsto the Exercise of Jurisdiction,
in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra

note 74, at 607-08; Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic
JurisdictionConsistent with the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, 167 MIL.
L. REv. 20, 44-63 (2001).
79 [T]he Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) the case is being
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) the case has been
investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute
the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State
genuinely to prosecute ....
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
so Id.

81 Kaul, supra note 78, at 607-08; Holmes, supra note 78, at 671-84.
82 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(b).
83 Id. art. 12(3).
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the U.N. talks by the U.S. delegation, and ultimately it was codified as
Article 18 of the Rome Statute. 84 Article 18 effectively precludes the ICC
from exercising jurisdiction for an entire atrocity crimes situation over
"nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts
which may constitute crimes referred to in Article 5 [genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and, if it achieves definitional and
operational status by amendment to the Rome Statute, the crime of
aggression] ...,85 But this deferral to national jurisdiction achieves
permanence only if the State, whether as a State Party or non-party State,
acts in good faith and does not give the Prosecutor and ultimately the PreTrial Chamber cause to question the ability or willingness of the State to
investigate those within its jurisdiction. An adverse judgment by the PreTrial Chamber can be appealed by the State concerned to the Appeals
86
Chamber of the ICC for final judgment as to the jurisdiction of the ICC.
With respect to U.S. constitutional issues, the advantage of the Article
18 procedure is that the United States, either as a non-party State or State
Party to the Rome Statute, can choose to preserve all constitutional
guarantees by acting in accordance with Article 18, and by investigating
and, if merited, prosecuting nationals or others within its jurisdiction strictly
in U.S. courts, criminal or military. If it chooses this path, then the ICC
would have no jurisdiction over U.S. nationals with respect to the entire
atrocity crimes situation under investigation by the ICC that has triggered
that particular Article 18 process.
The whole thrust of the negotiations leading to the Rome Statute was
to offer the opportunity to any State, including State Parties and non-party
States, to undertake their own domestic criminal procedures and associated
domestic constitutional guarantees, if applicable, in preference to ICC
jurisdiction.87 Obviously, where the State fails to seize that opportunity or

84 Scheffer, Staying the Course with the InternationalCriminal Court, supra note 7,at

87-89.
85Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 18; Holmes, supra note 78, at 681-82 (discussing
Article 18 procedures); Scheffer, Staying the Course with the InternationalCriminal Court,
supra note 7, at 87-90 (explaining how Article 18 operates under principles of
complementarity by requiring that the ICC defer to national legal systems that investigate
and prosecute those who commit atrocity crimes within such nation's jurisdiction); see also
SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 278-80 (examining admissibility of cases pursuant to Articles 18
and 19 of the Rome Statute).
86 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(4).
on the general objectives and statutory drafting of the
87 For background
complementarity principle, see generally 1998 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, at 15; M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS, AND INTEGRATED TEXT 98-101 (2005); SCHABAS, supra note 17,

at 171-86; Phillipe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference,
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it demonstrates an inability or unwillingness to perform at the national
level, then the Rome Statute cedes the investigative mandate to the ICC.
This would have clear consequences for a State Party, which then would
have to cooperate with the ICC's requests. 88 A non-party State could refuse
to cooperate with the ICC, in which case its nationals suspected of
committing atrocity crimes would remain at risk of arrest and trial before
the ICC if they are found on foreign territory and, either by performance of
an obligation of a State Party or by voluntary act of a non-party State, are
arrested and transferred to The Hague.
Whether or not the United States ultimately joins the ICC, if a case
involving a U.S. citizen or an individual falling within U.S. jurisdiction
ultimately were to be investigated and prosecuted before the ICC, that
would be a signal of failure or abandonment of complementarity by the
United States and its forfeited opportunity to conduct a strictly national
investigation and prosecution. If the United States were to become a State
Party to the Rome Statute, then a voluntary decision by the U.S.
government to deprive a national of a U.S. trial under U.S. law by refusing
to investigate and, if merited, prosecute the person in U.S. courts would not
be inconsequential to any federal judicial review of an individual's claim
(say, as a U.S. citizen) that he or she should not be transferred to the ICC in
the absence of a U.S. investigation. However unlikely it may seem, a
similar claim could be made if the United States as a non-party State were
to act in such a manner and nonetheless plan to transfer a U.S. citizen to the
ICC.
A supplemental firewall is the Article 98(2) non-surrender agreement,
a type of agreement which the United States can negotiate to prevent the
surrender of certain U.S. nationals or other individuals falling within its
national jurisdiction to the ICC, as can any other State to similarly protect
such individuals from being surrendered to the ICC. 89 Article 98(2) was
originally negotiated by the U.S. delegation as a means of preserving the
enforceability of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) covering its
hundreds of thousands of soldiers deployed overseas at any one time. 90
in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra

note 74, at 81-85.
88 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 86-102.
89 Id. art. 98(2) ("The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person
of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending
State for the giving of consent for the surrender.").
90 The use of the term "sending State" derives from the original American effort, very early in
the ICC negotiations, to preserve the rights accorded to its official personnel covered by status of
forces agreements (SOFAs) between the United States and scores of foreign governments and
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Over the years of talks the provision broadened to include agreements
between two or more States covering all official personnel that the "sending
State" deploys to the "receiving State." 91 However, the hundred or so
Article 98(2) non-surrender agreements entered into by the United States
with other nations 92 extend their coverage to all U.S. nationals, and not just
official personnel sent by the U.S. government to the receiving foreign
country. ICC judges may find them unenforceable, at least with respect to
private U.S. nationals, if they are used to shield certain individuals from the
jurisdiction of the Court.93
The Clinton Administration regarded Article 98(2) authority as
something it would use sparingly in the future, while classifying the many
existing SOFAs as agreements qualifying for Article 98(2) status in any
case. 94 The Bush Administration saw the Article 98(2) option as a means of
insulating Americans from the reach of the ICC throughout the world,
regardless of their personal status, whether as official personnel of the U.S.
government, tourists, businessmen, journalists, or mercenaries, and
launched an aggressive campaign to persuade and compel nations to enter
Status of Mission Agreements (SOMAs) that typically are negotiated in connection with United

Nations or multinational military operations. That requirement was advanced by US negotiators
during initial discussions about a permanent international criminal court with other governments
in 1995. The objective was to ensure that nothing we would negotiate for the establishment of
the ICC would undermine the protection and procedures regarding criminal investigations that
US personnel have under SOFAs and SOMAs, which exist in part to achieve the purpose of
criminal investigation and prosecution of US personnel deployed in foreign jurisdictions. Thus,
our objective was not to achieve immunity per se for such individuals, but to ensure that they
would be subject only to the judicial procedures set forth in the relevant SOFA or SOMA, and in
no other treaty.

David Scheffer, Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America's Original Intent, 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 333, 341 (2005).
9"Id. at 339.

92 The White House, Memorandum for the Secretary of State: Presidential Determination
on Waiving Prohibition on United States Military Assistance With Respect to Comoros and
Saint Kitts and Nevis (Nov. 22, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases
/2006/11/20061122-5.html; U.S. Department of State, Taken Questions: Countries Who
Have Signed Article 98 Agreements with the United States (June 12, 2003),

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/21539.htm ("A total of 38 countries have publicly
announced that they have concluded Article 98 or Non-Surrender Agreements with the
United States ...[s]everal other countries have signed but have asked us not to identify them
as signers.
We are respecting their wishes."); Press Statement, Richard Boucher,
Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement (May 3,
2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm ("On May 2, 2005, Angola became
the 100th country to conclude such an agreement with the United States. These bilateral
agreements, which are provided for under Article 98 of the Rome Statute, ensure that U.S.
persons will not be surrendered to the International Criminal Court without our consent.").
93Scheffer, supra note 90, at 352.
94Id. at 353; Scheffer, Staying the Course with the InternationalCriminal Court, supra
note 7, at 98 (2002).
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into bilateral agreements with the United States.95 The Article 98(2)
agreements signal a choice by the United States, currently as a non-party
State, to create conditions whereby a U.S. national who might be suspected
of committing atrocity crimes on foreign territory would be subject either to
the jurisdiction of the foreign courts of the nation in which he or she is
located or subject to U.S. jurisdiction, but not to ICC jurisdiction.
There are two considerable problems with the agreements negotiated
by the Bush Administration. The first problem is that the Administration
seeks to extend the agreements to protect all U.S. nationals regardless of
their official status. Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute refers to coverage of
persons of the sending State, which was intended to cover official personnel
96
of the sending State, but not other citizens who are not of official status.
The second problem is the appearance of impunity by the U.S. government.
The Article 98(2) agreements lack any requirement that in the event an
American citizen on the receiving State's territory is sought by the ICC for
alleged commission of an atrocity crime, the United States would
investigate and conduct any necessary prosecution of that individual in U.S.
courts, obligating the receiving State to extradite him or her to the United
States for that purpose.97
If, however, the United States were to use the opportunity afforded by
an Article 98(2) agreement to gain physical custody of the national and
investigate such person and, if merited, prosecute him or her before U.S.
courts, then all constitutional guarantees would be preserved in that
criminal proceeding. A decision by U.S. authorities not to exercise this
option when the opportunity presents itself, and thus expose the individual
to capture by and trial before the ICC, would appear to be a forfeiture by the
U.S. government of the U.S. national's full panoply of constitutional rights
and protections before U.S. courts. Although Article 98(2) non-surrender
agreements are only partially relevant to a constitutional inquiry, such
agreements are one more way the U.S. government, through use of a
politically sophisticated strategy, could achieve significant exclusivity over
the fates of individuals at risk of being investigated by the ICC for the
commission of atrocity crimes. With that exclusivity would arrive full
constitutional rights and protections before U.S. courts. Unfortunately, the
Bush Administration's strategy of overreach with such agreements may

95 See John R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Security, U.S. State
Dep't, American Justice and the International Criminal Court (Nov. 3, 2003) (transcript
available from The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the ICC
(AMICC)), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Boltonl 1_3_03.pdf.
96 Scheffer, supra note 90, at 339-42, 346.
9' Id. at 352-53.
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have seriously hindered the original goals of narrowly targeted Article 98(2)
non-surrender agreements.
The complementarity firewall will only work to ensure full application
of U.S. constitutional rights in American, as opposed to ICC, investigations
and trials if U.S. law substantially mirrors the crimes falling within the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Currently, that is not the case. There are significant
gaps in U.S. criminal law regarding many of the crimes against humanity
and many of the war crimes set forth in Articles 7 and 8, respectively, of the
Rome Statute. 98 That means that even if the United States, either as a nonparty State or as a State Party to the Rome Statute, was willing to exercise
its complementarity privilege to investigate a U.S. national for commission
of an atrocity crime under scrutiny by the ICC, it may not have the ability to
do so. While such gaps in federal criminal law should be of serious concern
and eliminated to defeat any claim of inability, it remains highly unlikely
that the United States would satisfy the test for "inability in a particular
case" under Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute. 99 There would have to be "a
total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system"
as the rationale for why the United States "is unable to obtain the accused
or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its
proceedings."' 0 0 The more plausible concern for the United States would
be the unwillingness test set forth in Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute,
which could become a considerable issue if there are gaps in federal
criminal law that provide a de facto "shield" for suspects and discourage
efforts to bring them to justice domestically.' '
A good example would be the crime against humanity of
persecution,10 2 which covers what is commonly described as "ethnic
cleansing.' 0 3 There is no basis in U.S. law to prosecute the crime of
persecution, which encompasses ethnic cleansing, as a crime against

98 No Safe Haven: Accountability for Human Rights Violations in the United States:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of David Scheffer, Mayer Brown/Robert A.
Helman Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfn?id=3028&witid=6778
[hereinafter Accountability Hearing]; see Michael Hatchell, Closing the Gaps in United
States Law and Implementing the Rome Statute: A Comparative Approach, 12 ILSA J. OF
INT'L & COMp. L. 183, 187-88 & 208 (2005) (examining the approach of five countries that
ratified the Rome Statute and how these approaches may instruct the United States).
99 Rome Statute, supra note 1.
'oo Id. art. 7(h).
lo Id.
102Id.
29-35
103 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milan Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-A, Judgement,

(July 18, 2005).
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humanity with all of the accompanying elements pertaining to magnitude
and planning. 10 4 ICC judges could determine that despite a U.S. willingness
to investigate certain actions by a U.S. national, U.S. law does not
criminalize such conduct. Indeed, U.S. law may not even provide
jurisdiction over the U.S. national who commits such an atrocity crime on
foreign territory. While efforts may be made by a U.S. Attorney to
prosecute the crime of murder or another common crime found in Title 18,
such efforts may be viewed by the ICC judges as insufficient to address the
actual crime in question. The definition and elements of the crime against
humanity of persecution simply do not exist in the U.S. Code.
Without the ability to exercise jurisdiction over any atrocity crimes
allegedly committed by U.S. nationals anywhere in the world, the United
States would forfeit its privilege to apply all U.S. constitutional due process
protections, including the right to trial by jury, for the benefit of U.S.
nationals sought by the ICC for the commission of crimes that are not
codified in U.S. Code Titles 10 and 18. This is an issue of great importance
whether or not the United States ratifies the Rome Statute. Even as a nonparty State, the United States is entitled to the complementarity privilege if
the ICC seeks to investigate and seek the arrest of a U.S. national for
commission of an atrocity crime on non-U.S. territory. Therefore, it is in
the highest interest of the United States to modernize its criminal codes,
civilian and military, so that it has the ability to investigate and prosecute
U.S. nationals before U.S. courts for the full range of atrocity crimes falling
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC. Such an option would
neutralize constitutional concerns about whether the ICC precisely
replicates all of the due process rights found in U.S. criminal trials, and it
would preserve the right to a jury trial for any U.S. national who merits
prosecution for any such atrocity crime. If the United States were to move
towards ratification of the Rome Statute, then such amendments to the
federal criminal and military codes would be essential components of the
implementing legislation required for such ratification.
III. Is AN ARTICLE III COURT ESSENTIAL FOR PROSECUTION OF AMERICANS
FOR ATROCITY CRIMES?

The International Criminal Court prosecutes international crimes of
the most significant character-genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and, potentially, aggression-and only when committed on scales of
magnitude, substantiality, and often transnational character typically not
found in domestic cases.10 5 The reality of the ICC's subject matter
1o4 Accountability Hearing,supra note 99, para. 18.
105 BASSIOUNI, supra note 87, at 148-57.
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jurisdiction over atrocity crimes has a critical bearing on whether U.S.
ratification of the Rome Statute would violate Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution which provides, in relevant part: "The judicial power of the
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior
10 6
courts as the Congress may from time to time establish."'
The Rome Statute has established an international criminal court
which the United States, if it were to become a State Party, would be
obligated to help pay for,'0 7 cooperate with, 10 8 elect judges and the
Prosecutor to apply justice at,'0 9 and, in certain circumstances, allow for the
prosecution of U.S. citizens before, the ICC."
The judicial power of the
ICC, however, is not that of the United States. It is the power of an
independent international criminal court, an international organization with
"international legal personality"'I and bound to no government's direction
or control, 1 2 established by treaty among the sovereign nations of the world
for a distinctly international purpose. If the United States were to ratify the
treaty establishing the ICC, it would be an exercise of the Article II treaty
power"' to build a uniquely-conceived international court and not an
exercise of the Article III, Section 1 power to establish a domestic court.
But serious considerations remain. "Article III, [Section] 1 safeguards
the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by barring
congressional attempts 'to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals]
for the purpose of emasculating' constitutional courts."'"1 4 Thus, "a given
congressional decision to authorize the adjudication of Article III business
in a non-Article III tribunal [may] impermissibly threaten[] the institutional
integrity of the Judicial Branch." '" 5 This is particularly so when "the right
being adjudicated is not of congressional creation," but protected in the
Constitution." 6 While these affirmations by the Supreme Court are
unassailable, they also point to why the establishment of the ICC and U.S.
participation in it are distinguishable and thus should be unconstrained by
the Article III, Section 1 authority.
art. III, § 1.
Statute, supra note 1, art. 115.
o Id. arts. 86-102.
109 Id. arts. 36, 42.
ll0 Id.arts. 12, 25.
106 U.S. CONST.
107 Rome

Id. art.

4(1).

112 Id. arts. 40(1), 42(1).
"' LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 4-5 & 6-33 (2d ed. 1988).
"14 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
850 (1986) (quoting
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting)).

"' Id. at 851.

116N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
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The ICC was neither conceived nor established for the purpose of
"emasculating constitutional courts."
The subject matter jurisdiction
embodied in the Rome Statute consists exclusively of international crimes,
only some of which are codified in U.S. law." 7 These are crimes of
concern to the entire international community, striking at the heart of
humankind. Much of the subject matter jurisdiction in the Rome Statute,
particularly crimes against humanity and some war crimes, does not exist in
federal criminal law and even in U.S. military law, so there would be no
transfer of jurisdiction of existing Article III power with respect to those
crimes if the United States were to ratify the Rome Statute." 8 Those
atrocity crimes of ICC jurisdiction which currently can be prosecuted in
U.S. courts, such as genocide 19 and some war crimes, 120 nonetheless
constitute international crimes of the most profound character. The
complementarity principle of the Rome Statute, discussed above, preserves
the Article III courts' existing jurisdiction over these crimes, but also
recognizes an alternative forum-one that is essentially inferior because of
the complementarity principle-for adjudicating these crimes in the event
U.S. prosecutors and courts fail to act or act so corruptly as to conduct sham
trial proceedings. By virtue of ratifying the Rome Statute, the United States
would consent to alternative jurisdiction to adjudicate a particular case by
the treaty-based ICC. If and when Congress amends U.S. Code Titles 10
and 18 to fully embrace the atrocity crimes of the Rome Statute, such
crimes would remain international crimes that are the sole focus of the ICC
as an alternative and, for all intents and purposes, secondary forum to U.S.
prosecution.
If in the future the Rome Statute were amended to incorporate into the
ICC's subject matter jurisdiction certain other crimes traditionally and
commonly prosecuted by national courts, including U.S. courts, then there
might be more reason to argue that Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
would complicate U.S. participation in the ICC, at least with respect to
those particular crimes. For example, if the ICC were empowered to
investigate and prosecute drug trafficking, terrorism, or offenses against
internationally protected persons, then it would be duplicating the
jurisdiction of Article III courts which have long prosecuted such actions as
domestic crimes with international ramifications. There were serious
117 These crimes include: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5-8; Accountability Hearing,supra note 98.
118Accountability Hearing,supra note 98.
119 18 U.S.C.A. § 1091 (2008) (as amended by the Genocide Accountability Act of 2007,

Pub. L. No. 110-151 (2007)).
12018 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (2008) (as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006)).
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efforts prior to and during the Rome negotiations in 1998 to include drug
trafficking and terrorism in the ICC's jurisdiction, but enough governments,
12
including the United States, opposed the proposals, which were defeated. 1
The U.S. delegation argued that existing multilateral treaties on drug
trafficking1 22 and terrorism 123 would be undermined if jurisdiction were
granted to the ICC. 124

A bedrock principle of these treaties is the

"prosecute or extradite" principle, which has long been applied to
strengthen national prosecutions of transnational crimes.125 Nonetheless,
the possibility remains that drug trafficking and terrorism may be
resurrected as candidates for inclusion in the ICC's subject matter
jurisdiction. 126 Pursuant to Article 121(5) of the Rome Statute, any State
Party could refuse to be subject to ICC jurisdiction over any such crime that
121Scheffer, Staying the Course with the InternationalCriminal Court, supra note 7, at
47 n.7 (2002).
122 E.g., Declaration of Cartagena Concerning the Production of, Trafficking in and
Demand for Illicit Drugs, Feb. 15, 1990, T.I.A.S. 12,411, 1990 WL 484467; Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, U.N.
Doc. E/CONF.82/15, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95, reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 493 (revised Dec. 19, 1998);
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Aug. 16, 1976, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175;
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Dec. 13, 1964, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204.
123See, e.g., Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, June, 3, 2002, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 107-18, 42 I.L.M. 19; International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-49, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000);
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 9, 1998, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 106-6, 37 I.L.M. 249 (1998); International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents, Feb. 20, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention to Prevent and
Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related
Extortion that are of Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 1986 U.N.T.S. 195.
124 Comments of the United States of America Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General
Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court, 14-18,
delivered to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/1/Add.2 (Apr. 3, 1995). This was
the first extensive set of written views of the U.S. Government regarding the draft statute of
an international criminal court prepared by the International Law Commission in 1994, and
which formed the initial basis for U.N. Member State negotiations commencing in 1995.
The U.S. Government explained on these pages its primary objections to the inclusion of
drug crimes and terrorism in the subject matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court.
125 BASSIOUNI, supra note 76, 9-10, 15, 424, 432, 441-42, 448, & 461; see also M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO
EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995)

(providing a comprehensive

analysis of the duty to extradite or prosecute).
126 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (July 17,
2005); Rome Statute, supra note 1, Resolution E; Scheffer, Staying the Course with the
InternationalCriminalCourt, supra note 7, at 47 n.7 (2002).
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is added by amendment to the Rome Statute. 27 The United States could
exercise that prerogative and thus avoid contentious challenges regarding
the Article III, Section 1 power, and even stipulate that policy choice in a
declaration attached to its ratification of the Rome Statute.
This line of reasoning is not meant to suggest that Congress refrain
from amending U.S. Code Titles 10 and 18 to incorporate all of the atrocity
crimes framing the subject matter jurisdiction of the Rome Statute. We
strongly believe it should do so, preferably as implementing legislation
prior to ratification. If federal and military courts were empowered to
adjudicate the full range of atrocity crimes, these crimes' unique
international character should compel the United States to join with other
nations to ensure their investigation and prosecution in both national courts
and, if it proves necessary, before the ICC. By using the treaty power
invested by the Constitution to achieve that objective, the President would
ensure the enforcement of essentially the same law before federal and
military courts and, as a strictly secondary step, before the ICC.
Another consideration is the reality that not all crimes committed in
the United States by U.S. citizens warrant a trial before an Article III
court. 28 Typically, U.S. citizens are afforded this right, and the Supreme
Court has held multiple times that ordinary civilians should not be tried
before a military court marshal or by a military tribunal. 129 However, where
U.S. citizens are spies or unlawful combatants, the right to appear before an
Article III court may be lost. For instance, in Ex parte Quirin,130 several
spies, one of whom was a U.S. citizen, who had entered the United States
on behalf of Germany to destroy war industries and facilities in the United
States were denied the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court held that

127

Rome Statute,

supranote 1, art. 121(5) provides:

Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States
Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the
Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when
committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory.
128

See notes 201-09 and accompanying text.

129 E.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (A Confederate sympathizer was convicted

for sedition in a military tribunal, a non-Article III court. The court granted his habeas
petition and ordered his release. The Supreme Court seemed to have been persuaded that a
military court was not proper by the fact that Milligan was not a resident of the rebellious
states and was not involved in military action.); cf Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956)
(holding that two civilian women married to servicemen were improperly convicted of
murder before respective court marshal proceedings).
130 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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a military commission was lawfully constituted and could lawfully try the
petitioners. 131
A service member in the case of United States v. Keaton appealed his
conviction of assault with intent to commit murder, challenging that his trial
132
was by court-martial without the full protections of the U.S. Constitution.13 3
The crime occurred while the petitioner was stationed in the Philippines.
The petitioner's victim was a fellow service member. 134 Although that fact
alone would have been enough for the court to affirm the court-martial
decision, the court further discussed whether a United States citizen could
be tried abroad by the United States in a non-Article III court.

35

The

Keaton court interpreted Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution,
empowering Congress "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces," as enabling Congress to adjudicate service
personnel through court martial proceedings. 36 The court reasoned that
there are numerous "offenses which could be committed by a serviceman
overseas for which he could not be returned to the United Statesfor trial,
nor be given the benefits of indictment and trial by jury," and finally
concluded, "[F]oreign trial by court-martial of all offenses under the Code
committed abroad, including those which could be tried by Article III
courts if committed
in this country, is a valid exercise of constitutional
137
authority.,

Similarly, in Bell v. Clark,138 a serviceman court-martialed for the rape
of a German citizen while stationed in Germany petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus. Bell's theory was that he should have all the protections of
an Article III court in his trial because his crime was not connected to his
military service. The court disagreed, reasoning that because the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement was a constitutional exercise by Congress of its
power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, the "statute did not clothe the
serviceman with any vested privilege. 139
The United States routinely extradites individuals to non-Article III
courts, as discussed in Part IV below. Foreign courts and international
tribunals, such as the ICTY and ICTR, do not comport with Article III; they
are neither inferior to the Supreme Court nor are they established by
Id. at 48.

'

132 United States v. Keaton, 41 C.M.R. 64 (C.M.A. 1969).
131 Id. at 65-66.
14 Id. at 67.
13 Id.
136 Id.

Id. (emphases added).
1' 437 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971).
137

9 Id.

at 203.
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Congress. Nonetheless, Congress did not legislatively prohibit prosecution
of U.S. citizens before the ICTY or ICTR, however hypothetical the
possibility of such a prosecution. Such a prosecution could have occurred
before either tribunal if the circumstances had warranted. There is no
documentary evidence that Congress factored in the risk of prosecution of a
U.S. national before either the ICTY or ICTR when considering acceptance
of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. Nevertheless, the possibility of such
prosecution clearly existed and was never denied in congressional
deliberations. The experience described in Part IV(C) of Elizaphan
Ntakirutimana, who was not a U.S. citizen but was an immigrant protected
by his green-card status, is instructive about the willingness of federal
courts to extradite an indictee to the ICTR or, if the opportunity had arisen,
to the ICTY.
While the Article III, Section 1 mandate of the Constitution presents
tempting arguments for doubters of American ratification of the Rome
Statute, we hope we have introduced some compelling reasons why the ICC
would not contravene this particular constitutional requirement with respect
to the U.S. judiciary. In the twenty-first century, when the need to
effectively investigate and prosecute perpetrators of atrocity crimes is
irrefutable and yet so difficult to achieve, the Constitution should be
interpreted pragmatically, with our vision pointed to the future and in a
manner that preserves our constitutional principles of both domestic and
international justice. The discussion in this Part and in Parts IV and V
below seek to accomplish that aim.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ARTICLE II TREATY POWER
The investigation and prosecution of atrocity crimes necessarily
requires transnational judicial endeavors. There is a compelling logic
behind governments, entering into a treaty relationship that establishes a
criminal court to bring to justice the perpetrators of the most widespread
and destructive crimes known to humankind and often of cross-border
character and consequence. 140 It is a legitimate subject of treaties, one of
which the United States joined with other sovereign powers to negotiate and
complete. That treaty-making process, culminating in the Rome Statute,
presents the U.S. government with the opportunity of joining an
international effort to prosecute and, one hopes, deter atrocity crimes in
coming decades. It is a matter in which the United States has a legitimate
140 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

495-99

(2003); Antonio Cassese, From Nuremberg to Rome: InternationalMilitary Tribunals to the
International Criminal Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra note 74, at 10-18.
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and abiding interest and that goes to the core of upholding the rule of law in
a dangerous world. Would the President, following adoption of all requisite
implementing legislation by Congress and approval of ratification by the
Senate, or Congress pursuant to Congressional-Executive Agreement,
comply with the Constitution by committing the United States to a treaty
for that purpose?
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution empowers the President "by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur."' 141 Treaties are binding on the
various states and, under the Supremacy Clause, have the same force of law
as a federal statute. 142 Where a later-in-time statute conflicts with a treaty,
143
the statute takes precedence over the treaty for purposes of domestic law.
Where a later-in-time treaty conflicts with a statute, the treaty takes
44
precedence over the statute.1
Though the Rome Statute presents a sui generis court for the United
States to examine pursuant to the treaty power, it is instructive to examine
how far federal courts have historically gone to validate foreign criminal
proceedings that involve U.S. citizens. 145 There is nothing in the sweep of
constitutional law explicitly precluding the United States from (1) entering
an international agreement, either an extradition treaty or a treaty such as
the Rome Statute, to provide for the criminal trial in a foreign court of a
U.S. national who has committed a crime abroad even if that court's
procedures fail to meet all U.S. constitutional standards; or (2) enforcing the
judgment of a foreign court even if it lacked some of the U.S. constitutional
141U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 2.
142U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829), overruled
on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
143Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933).
144Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884);

The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870) ("A treaty may supersede a prior act of
Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty ....); see RONALD D.
ROTUNDA

& JoH-N E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW: SUBSTANCE

AND

PROCEDURE 814-15 (4th ed. 2007).
145 See, e.g., Chariton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); Wright v. Henkel,
190 U.S. 40
(1903); In re Chan Seong-I, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D.N.M. 2004); Prasoprat v. Benov, 421
F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Munguia, 294 F. Supp. 2d 893 (S.D. Tex. 2003); In re
Sacirbegovic, 280 F. Supp. 2d 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110
(7th Cir. 1997); Bovio v. United States, 989 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1993); In re Russell, 805 F.2d
1215 (5th Cir. 1986); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986); Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir.
1980); In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Cal. 1997); Brief of Respondent-Appellee at
1, Clarey v. Gregg, 138 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-55193), 1996 WL 33485532

("Mexico requests the extradition of appellant David Lee Carey, a citizen of the United
States....").
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guarantees of due process. Federal courts have rejected the notion that
"each element of due process as known to American criminal law must be
present in a foreign criminal proceeding before Congress may give a
conviction rendered by a foreign tribunal binding effect." 146 They have also
held that "the [F]ifth [A]mendment permits the United States [pursuant to
treaty] to enforce the sentences meted out by' 147
foreign courts, even if those
procured."
'unconstitutionally'
were
sentences
A. STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS
The United States has regularly used the treaty power to permit foreign
sovereigns to exercise criminal jurisdiction over American citizens who
serve in the Armed Forces abroad. 148 A sovereign nation generally has
jurisdiction over the crimes committed within its territory. 149
A
longstanding rule of war, however, is that occupying troops are exempt
from the criminal jurisdiction of the enemy country. 150 The Supreme Court,
in Dow v. Johnson, explained that it would be singularly absurd to permit
151
an officer or soldier of an invading army to be tried by his enemy.
Following World War II, U.S. troops occupied or were stationed in certain
countries with the host country's consent. 152 Because such a host country
was no longer an active enemy, the reasoning in providing such occupying
or stationed forces immunity from jurisdiction did not apply. It became
necessary and desirable for jurisdiction over such troops to be negotiated

146

Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1197 (2d Cir. 1980).

147 Pfeifer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 468 F. Supp. 920, 924 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
148

See, e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957); Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp.

97 (D.D.C. 1968); United States ex rel. Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
United States v. Dadenhead, 34 C.M.R. 51 (C.M.A. 1963); United States v. Hutcherson, 29
C.M.R. 770 (A.F.B.R. 1960); United States v. Sinigar 20 C.M.R. (C.M.A. 1955); cf
Gallagher v. United States, 423 F.2d 1371 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (holding that a soldier charged with
robbery committed in Germany, while he stationed there, was properly tried by U.S. court
martial, under jurisdiction provided by the NATO SOFA).
149 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 20
(1965).
15o In part, immunity for members of the armed forces is based on the doctrine of
sovereign immunity-a foreign nation will not be hauled into a foreign court unless it
submits to such a court's jurisdiction. 17 A.L.R. FED. 725, at § 5 (1973). Members of the
armed forces, while not representatives of the sovereign in the same sense as a head of state
is a representative, cannot be said "to be totally 'nonrepresentative' of the sovereign." Id.
151 Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 180 (1879).
152 See JOHN WOODLIFFE, THE PEACETIME USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND
MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW

15 (1992) (describing the peacetime U.S. military presence

following World War II around the world).
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and established in a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). 153 For example,
the United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization entered into a SOFA 154 which has served as a model for
SOFAs with other countries. 155 There are no less than seventy-five SOFAs
(including "status of military personnel" and "status of military and civilian
personnel" agreements) to which the United States is a party, 156 in addition
to the NATO SOFA,
which has twenty-five State members in addition to
57
the United States. 1
A SOFA generally provides for both exclusive jurisdiction and
concurrent jurisdiction. 158 The sending country generally retains exclusive
jurisdiction over criminal acts that are crimes under its laws, but not under
the laws of the host country. 159 For offenses that are crimes under the laws
of both the sending country and the host country, there is concurrent
jurisdiction.' 60 Furthermore, the sending country has primary concurrent
jurisdiction over certain offenses involving the property or persons of U.S.
forces or the United States and for offenses that are committed in the line of
duty. 161 Other common crimes committed off-duty on the foreign territory
of the host country generally fall under the primary jurisdiction of the host
country and its local criminal courts, pursuant to the terms of the particular
SOFA.
Various SOFAs and SOFA-like treaties have been held to be
constitutional by U.S. courts. 62 The leading case on this issue is Wilson v.
153

James S. Fraser, Some Thoughts on Status of Force Agreements, 3 CONN. L.

REV.

335,

335 (1970).
154 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of
Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67- [hereinafter NATO SOFA].
155 Mark E. Eichelman, InternationalCriminal JurisdictionIssues for the United States
Military,ARMY LAW., Aug. 2000, at 23.
156 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE, SECTION 1: BILATERAL TREATIES
(2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/treaties/83046.pdf (follow "bilaterals"
hyperlink).
157 NATO SOFA, supra note 154.
158 This is true for the NATO SOFA. See id. art. VII; Holmes v.
Laird, 459 F.2d 1211,
1212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see Richard J. Erikson, Status of ForcesAgreements: A Sharing of
Sovereign Prerogative,37 A.F. L. Rev. 137, 140-41 (1994) (discussing that the purpose of a
SOFA is to provide for shared jurisdiction and highlighting the example of this in the NATO
SOFA).
159 Donald T. Kramer, CriminalJurisdiction of Courts ofForeign Nations over American
Armed Forces Stationed Abroad, 17 A.L.R. FED. 725, § 2[a] (1973); see BASSIOUNI, supra
note 76, at 96-97.
160 Kramer, supra note 159, § 2[a].
161 Id.
162 E.g., Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1968) (finding no merit in
petitioner's claim that a SOFA between the United States and Korea is unconstitutional
because Korea had not waived jurisdiction in the SOFA over the offense petitioner

DAVID SCHEFFER& ASHLEY COX

1014

[Vol. 98

Girard, where the Supreme Court denied a habeas corpus petition of163a
serviceman indicted by Japan for causing death by wounding.
Serviceman Girard shot an empty case at a Japanese woman gathering spent
ammunition cartridges and killed her.' 64 The United States and Japan had
in place a Security Treaty whereby the United States had jurisdiction over
its service members who committed offenses arising out of their official
duties. 165 Japan argued that Girard's action was not in the scope of his
duties, but the United States waived jurisdiction nevertheless. 166 The
Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional or statutory bar to the
United States waiving jurisdiction that was original to Japan 67and which
Japan had given to the United States pursuant to the agreement. 1
Another example, albeit at the district court level, is Holmes v. Laird,
where two American service members petitioned for an injunction to
prevent their surrender to Germany, where they had been convicted 168
of
invalid.
be
would
surrender
such
that
judgment
declaratory
a
and
crimes,
The Court held that "the controlling considerations are the interacting
interests of the United States and of foreign countries, and in assessing them
[the court] must move with circumspection appropriate when [it] is
adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct of our international
relations."' 69 Because all of the criminal elements had occurred in
Germany, absent some agreement, Germany as a sovereign nation "ha[d]
exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within
its borders, unless
it expressly or impliedly consent[ed] to surrender its
170
jurisdiction.,

committed); Keefe v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (finding no violation of soldier's
constitutional rights in a French trial where, under a NATO SOFA, a Staff Judge Advocate
was present at the trial and reported no violations); see, e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524
(1957) (finding no constitutional bar to surrendering an American to Japan in accordance
with a Security Treaty between the United States and Japan); Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d
513 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding the United States' Military Bases Agreement with the
Philippines that, inter alia, provided for the jurisdiction of U.S. service members stationed
there, constitutional).
163 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
"6 Id. at 525-26.
165 Id. at
167

526-28.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 530.

168

459 F.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

166

169 Id. at 1215 (citing Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383

(1959)).
170 Id. at 1216 (citing Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. at 529; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15
n.29 (1957)).
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B. EXTRADITION TREATIES

A prominent example of using the treaty power to authorize the use of
foreign courts for the prosecution of U.S. nationals is found in the
widespread practice of extradition treaties. 171 The Supreme Court has
upheld the extradition of U.S. nationals to foreign courts even though the
extradition treaty used for this purpose did not secure the full range of U.S.
constitutional protections for such nationals in such foreign courts. 172 The
Supreme Court has held, "We are bound by the existence of an extradition
treaty to assume that the trial will be fair."17 3 One scholar notes that in
extradition cases:
[C]ourts follow a "rule of non-inquiry" and refrain from assessing the requesting
government's investigative, legal, and penal systems ....Courts have applied the rule
of non-inquiry in situations involving a wide variety of [prisoner] allegations, many of
which, if proven, would violate due process were the United States the offending
party ....All circuits that have considered the issue have174adopted the rule of noninquiry, even when the defendant is a United States citizen.

Extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature, nor do they fall
under Article III. 175 The role of the court is to independently review the
extradition request, and make the following limited findings: (1) the
accused person (the relator) is in fact the same person named in the request;
(2) a valid extradition treaty exists between the U.S. and the requesting
country; (3) the offense is extraditable, including satisfaction of dual
criminality; (4) the facts establish probable cause that the relator committed
171See BASSIOUNI, supra note 76, 58-61, 106-11.
172 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 & 125 (1901) (affirming the extradition of a
U.S. citizen to Cuba, even though Cuba would not guarantee the same rights, privileges, and
immunities as provided by the U.S. Constitution). For an example of a lower court
following this principle, see Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 410-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(denying the habeas corpus petition of a U.S. citizen found extraditable to Israel, inter alia,
because, even though some of Israel's practices would fail U.S. due process standards, the
country generally provides fair trials), affd,910 F.2d. 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
173Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911).
174Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry
in InternationalExtraditionProceedings,76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198, 1205 (1991).
175Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he judiciary serves an
independent review function delegated to it by the Executive and defined by statute.");
Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 603 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Extradition magistrates do not exercise
powers traditionally 'reserved to Article III courts.' To the contrary, the function performed
by the judicial officer in certifying extraditability has not historically been considered an
exercise of the 'judicial power of the United States'

at all .... The judicial officer

conducting an extradition hearing is said to act in a 'non-institutional capacity by virtue of
special authority."'); see 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (codifying that the certification procedures of an
extradition hearing are limited and based on probable cause determinations); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 478 (1987) (describing U.S.
extradition procedures).

1016

DAVID SCHEFFER & ASHLEY COX

[Vol. 98

the actions alleged; and (5) the proceedings have complied with the treaty
obligations. 176 Under the well-entrenched rule of non-inquiry, federal
177
courts do not consider what due process the relator will face if extradited.
This is so even if the relator fears torture 178 or claims a denial of a fair
trial. 179 If the relator is certified as extraditable, the Secretary of State
makes the final
determination as to whether the relator in fact will be
0
extradited.18
The few exceptions to the rule of non-inquiry are the "political offense
exception," if a treaty includes such a provision, and the so-called "Gallina
exception."
The political offense exception may apply to protect a
revolutionary against extradition for crimes against a State or for a typical
crime that is incident to rebellion or war. 18' Not every crime that touches

176

See, e.g., Sacirbey v. Guccioine, No. 05 Cv. 2949 (BSJ)(FM), 2006 WL 2585561

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2006).
177 Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 12223 & 125 (1901); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
PROCEDURE: LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 478 (1987) (describing U.S. extradition

procedures). For a thoughtful analysis of the rule of non-inquiry, see Semmelman, supra
note 174.
178 Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075, reh'g en bane, 386 F.3d 938 (9th Cir.
2004) (denying the habeas corpus petition of a Mexican citizen who the Secretary of State
determined would be extradited to Mexico because, even though the citizen feared torture,
neither the Torture Convention nor FARR Act created private rights that displaced the rule
of non-inquiry); United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention), implemented by the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681822 (Oct. 21, 1998) (codified as Note to 8 U.S.C. § 1231) (FARR Act). See also BASSIOUNI,
supra note 76, at 608 ("The surrender of a relator, whether a United States citizen or not, is
unimpaired by the absence in the requesting state of those specific safeguards available in
the United States legal system, and therefore no judicial inquiry into the requesting state's
legal system is permitted.").
179 Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1972) (denying the
habeas corpus petition of a lawful U.S. resident found extraditable to Peru who feared an
unfair trial there, the court explained: "With respect to appellant's contention that upon his
return to Peru he will be charged with, and tried for, other crimes distinct and unrelated to
the offense with which he is now charged, we are not at liberty to speculate that the Republic
of Peru will not recognize and live up to the obligations subsisting between it and the United
States. Neither are we permitted to inquire into the procedure which awaits the appellant
upon his return."); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960) (denying the habeas corpus
petition of a relator who was found extraditable to Italy even though he claimed his trial
there in absentia was unfair).
180 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184 (2008).
18' Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896) (affirming the magistrate's denial of a habeas
corpus petition where petitioners claimed that their offenses were committed in furtherance
of a revolution, but where the magistrate was not clearly erroneous in finding that offenses
were not solely of a political character); Ex parte Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981)
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politics is swept into this exception's reach. 182 Furthermore, courts do not
consider whether the83requesting country has political motivations behind an
extradition request. 1

The Gallina exception has a potentially broad reach, but thus far has
never been cited as a reason to prevent extradition. 8 4 In Gallina v. Fraser,
the Second Circuit denied a relator's habeas petition, in part because,
although the requesting country, Italy, had tried the relator in absentia and
the relator thus had no opportunity to face his accusers, the federal court
does not "inquire into the procedures which await the relator upon
extradition."' 185 The court reasoned that "the authority that does exist points
clearly to the proposition that the conditions under which a fugitive is to be
surrendered to a foreign country are to be determined solely by the nonjudicial branches of the Government."'' 86 However, in oft-quoted dicta, the
court formed a hypothesis that a future case could exist where the relator
"upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so

(affirming the magistrate judge's denial of extradition certification in response to the UK's
request for extradition where petitioner was charged with the attempted murder of a British
soldier because petitioner, a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, could avail
himself of the political offense exception); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980)
(denying petitioner's habeas corpus petition because offenses were not of a political
character. "American courts have uniformly construed 'political offense' to mean those that
are incidental to severe political disturbances such as war, revolution and rebellion." Id. at
173). See also David Lieberman, Note, Sorting the Revolutionaryfrom the Terrorist: The
Delicate Application of the Political Offenses Exception, 59 STAN. L. REv. 181, 185-211
(2006) (analyzing the "incidence test"--whether the act occurred during a "revolt,
disturbance, or uprising" and whether the act was "incidental to the uprising or... formed
part of it," id. at 188-89); R. Stuart Phillips, The PoliticalOffense Exception and Terrorism:
Its Place in the CurrentExtradition Scheme and Proposalsfor Its Future, 15 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 337, 340-45 (1997) (analyzing the political offense exception: "The political offense
exception was created to protect dissidents from judicial retribution for their political
activities." Id. at 340).
182 For instance, financial fraud involving political corruption is outside the exception.
See, e.g., Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 170-73 (1st Cir. 1991); Garcia-Guillem v.
United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1971). The exception has been denied to
former government officials. See, e.g., In re Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 683-85 &
703-07 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Sacirbey v. Guccioine, No. 05 Cv. 2949(BSJ)(FM), 2006 WL
2585561 at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2006); In re Sacirbegovic, No. 03 CR. MISC.
01PAGE1, 2005 WL 107094 at *10-12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2005).
183 See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513 (7th Cir. 1981) ("It is the settled rule that
it is within the Secretary of State's sole discretion to determine whether or not a country's
requisition for extradition is made with a view to try or punish the fugitive for a political
crime, i.e., whether the request is a subterfuge.").
184 However, the case has been cited favorably. See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776
F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985); Rosado v.Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1195 (2d Cir. 1980).
185 278 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1960).
186 Id. at 79.
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decency as to require
antipathetic to a federal court's sense 18of
7
reexamination of the principle set out above.,
The Second Circuit has since distanced itself from the Gallina
exception. In Ahmad v. Wigen, Ahmad, an American citizen, feared torture,
a denial of a fair trial, and inhumane treatment if extradited. 8 The Eastern
District of New York set forth the exceptions to the rule of non-inquiry,
including the Gallina exception. 89 The court then analyzed the Israeli
criminal justice system as relevant to petitioner's claims. 90 Ultimately, the
court held that Ahmad failed to present evidence on "a preponderance
standard" to establish that he would indeed face the abuses he feared.' 91
The court entrusted the State Department to look after the defendant and to
"ensure against maltreatment."'' 92 Although the Second Circuit affirmed
this decision, the court was quite clear that the district court inappropriately
examined the criminal justice system of the country requesting
extradition. 93 Instead of using Gallina to support fact-finding as to
whether petitioner would face conditions "antipathetic to a federal court's
Id.
726 F. Supp. 389, 395,416-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d. 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
189 Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. 389 at 410-15.
187

188

190

Id. at 416-20.

191

The preponderance standard was applicable because the hearing was civil, not

criminal. Id. at 416.
192 Id. at 420.
193 Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d. 1063, 1064-65 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Although we affirm, we
do not necessarily subscribe to the district court's dicta concerning the expanded role of
habeas corpus in an extradition proceeding, which led to the district court's extensive
exploration of Israel's system of justice. In Messina v. United States ... we held that on an
appeal from the denial of habeas corpus in an extradition proceeding, we are concerned only
with whether the appellant's alleged offense fell within the terms of an extradition treaty,
and whether an official with jurisdiction was presented with sufficient evidence to warrant a
finding that there was a reasonable ground to believe that the appellant was guilty. As
authority for this proposition, we cited [the Supreme Court case] Fernandez v. Phillips.
Fernandez was not an isolated precedent. Indeed, the Supreme Court has adhered
steadfastly to the above legal principle for more than a century .... As we are required to
do, we have followed where the Supreme Court has led .... Unless Congress or the
Supreme Court instructs otherwise, the general principle above expressed should continue to
guide a habeas corpus court in its deliberations." (internal citations omitted)). The court
further wrote:
We have no problem with the district court's rejection of Ahmad's remaining argument to the
effect that, if he is returned to Israel, he probably will be mistreated, denied a fair trial, and
deprived of his constitutional and human rights. We do, however, question the district court's
decision to explore the merits of this contention in the manner that it did. The Supreme Court's
above-cited cases dealing with the scope of habeas corpus review carefully prescribe the limits of
such review .... A consideration of the procedures that will or may occur in the requesting
country is not within the purview of a habeas corpus judge.

Id. at 1066 (internal citations omitted).
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sense of decency," 194 as would be expected if the exception had any teeth,
the Second Circuit cited Gallina for the proposition that "consideration of
the procedures that will or may occur in the requesting country is not within
the purview of a habeas corpus judge."' 95 The Second Circuit left such
considerations of 96a sovereign nation's criminal justice system to the
executive branch. 1

A more recent case, albeit in a district court, found that the rule of noninquiry trumps any potential application of the Gallina exception. In In re
Sandhu, the court acknowledged that the relators were likely to be tortured
if extradited, but agreed with the government's interpretation of Ahmad as
precluding a denial of extraditability based on Gallina.'97 Because,
according to Ahmad, "the court may not examine conditions in the
requesting country, and only the Department of State may deny extradition
on humanitarian grounds," the district court found that the "Second Circuit
now treats the non-inquiry doctrine as absolute.' 98
Extradition may be appropriate even if the criminal conduct was
committed within the territory of the United States. For instance, in United
States v. Melia, a U.S. citizen was extradited to Canada for trial of
conspiracy to commit murder, despite the fact that the murder was planned
to occur within the United States. 99 The critical nexus to Canada were
telephone conversations between the U.S. citizen and a Canadian coconspirator.'

°°

In Valencia v. Scott,20 1 two U.S. citizens were extradited to

France for their participation in a cocaine smuggling scheme, which they
supervised from Queens, New York.20 2 A U.S. citizen was extradited to the
United Kingdom following certification in Austin v. Healy for conspiring
from New York to commit a murder in the United Kingdom.20 3
The relator in In re Extradition of Muhamed Sacirbegovic (Sacirbey)
was a citizen of the United States for all relevant times and the alleged
194

Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960).

' Ahmad, 910 F.2d. at 1066 (citing Gallina,278 F.2d at 79)).

Id. (quoting Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he degree of risk
to [appellant's] life from extradition is an issue that properly falls within the exclusive
purview of the executive branch.").
197 In re Sandhu, No. 90 CR. Misc No. 1JCF, 1996 WL 469290 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19,
1996).
198 Sandhu, 1996 WL 469290 at *5, habeas petition denied sub nom Sandhu v. Burke,
No. 97 Civ. 4608(JGK), 2000 WL 191707 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2000). Other commentators
share this interpretation of Ahmad. See, e.g., Semmelman, supra note 174, at 1219-21.
'9 667 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
200 Id. at 302-03.
201 CV 90-3745 (RJD), CV 91-1959 (RJD), 1992 WL 75036 (Mar. 24,1992).
196

202

Id. at *1.

203 5 F.3d 598, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1993).
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crime, embezzlement, occurred exclusively within the United- States.20 4
Sacirbey argued that because the alleged criminal conduct was solely within
the United States, the requesting country, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH),
lacked jurisdiction.0 5 Interpreting an ambiguous treaty provision on
jurisdiction broadly to refer to "the legal authority of a party to hear and
decide a case,, 20 6 the court found that Sacirbey's acts were thus within
BiH's jurisdiction because the alleged criminal conduct "likely would have
had a detrimental effect in BiH, and.., this consequence could reasonably
have been anticipated and intended., 207 Sacirbey was later certified as
extraditable.20 8
204 In re Extradition of Sacirbegovic, No. 03 CR. MISC. 01PAGE1, 2005 WL 107094 at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2005). Sacirbey was born in Sarajevo in 1956, but became a U.S.
citizen in 1973. Id. at * 1. He was an ambassador to the United Nations on behalf of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 2000. Id. In connection with his
ambassadorship, he was accused of embezzling funds he may have co-mingled and, in any
event, for which he could not account. Id. The alleged criminal acts were committed solely
in New York City. Id.
205 In re Extradition of Sacirbegovic, 280 F. Supp. 2d 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
206 Id. at 85 (citing Vardy v. United States, 529 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 1976)

("extradition treaties should be construed liberally")); Extradition of Neto, No. 98 CR. MISC
OPAGE19, 1998 WL 898328 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1998) (quoting United States v.
Cancino-Perez, 151 F.R.D. 521, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)) ("It is well-established that courts
should construe extradition treaties liberally 'to achieve their purposes of providing for the
surrender of fugitives for trial in the requesting country."'); In re La Salvia, No. 84 Cr. Misc.
1, 1986 WL 1436, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1986) (noting that if the treaty is subject to no
more than one reasonable interpretation, a court should "construe it in a manner that will
permit extradition").
207 Sacirbegovic, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 85-86. (citing Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300,
303-04 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) ("Acts done
outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it,
justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the
effect.
); see also United States v. Marasco, 275 F. Supp. 492, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(holding that an almost identically worded treaty demonstrated "an extradition whenever the
extraditee is shown prima facie to have intended the harm and caused the harm to the
demanding state substantially as claimed by the latter"). The Magistrate Judge found that no
special circumstances existed to permit Sacirbey to post bail, and thus, his request was
denied. Id. at 86. Approximately a year and a half later, however, Sacirbey again requested
that he be released on bail. Sacirbegovic, 2004 WL 1490219 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2004).
Sacirbey presented a letter on his behalf from the head of the BiH government.
Sacirbegovic, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of BiH, Adnan Terzic, wrote that the United States "should grant bail to
Ambassador Sacirbey until the final decision regarding extradition is made." Id. Sacirbey's
motion was granted, and the Magistrate Judge later wrote that the letter "tipped the special
circumstances test in Sacirbey's favor." In re Extradition of Sacirbegovic, No. 03 CR.
MISC. OIPAGE1, 2005 WL 107094 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2005).
208 Sacirbegovic, 2005 WL 107094. Although Sacirbey argued that no valid extradition
treaty existed between the United States and BiH, the court found that BiH had inherited the
treaty obligations of the Kingdom of Serbia, the original party to the treaty under which BiH
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Though the alleged crimes at issue in Melia, Valencia, Austin, and
Sacirbey pale in comparison to the atrocity crimes that are investigated and
prosecuted before the ICC, it is the international character and gravity of
such crimes that we contend should create an even stronger basis for
surrender to the ICC if the United States were to become a State Party to the
Rome Statute. These cases show that if the United States were to fail to

meet the complementarity test under the treaty-a test that creates the
opportunity for enforcement of every constitutional protection an American
is entitled to before a U.S. court-and thus trigger an ICC request for arrest
and surrender of the person to the ICC, there is well-settled precedent in
extradition practice for doing so.
C. EXERCISE OF THE TREATY POWER TO PROSECUTE ATROCITY
CRIMES

The Executive Branch can exercise the treaty power through any one
of three types of agreements: a treaty that requires two-thirds consent of the
Senate; a congressional-executive agreement requiring the majority vote of
both the Senate and the House of Representatives; or an executive
agreement entered into solely by the President or his empowered
representatives and pursuant to legislative authority.20 9 For example, all of
the Article 98(2) non-surrender agreements 210 are executive agreements
entered into by the Executive Branch alone pursuant to authority granted by
Congress in the American Service Members Protection Act. 2 1 President
Clinton also entered into exclusive agreements with the ICTY and ICTR in

requested Sacirbey's extradition. Id. at *10-11. Next, the court found that Sacirbey was one
and the same with "Muhamed Sacirbgovic" as the individual named in the request, and that
the alleged offense was an extraditable offense under the treaty. Id. at * 12-17. Because the
alleged act would be unlawful in the United States, the requirement of dual criminality was
satisfied. Id. at * 17-18. Further, the court found that the government established probable
cause that Sacirbey committed the offense. Id. at * 18-19. Sacirbey argued that the political
offense exception applied, but the Court found it did not because financial fraud, even
involving political corruption, generally falls outside the political offense exception. Id. at
* 19-20. Further, the political offense exception focuses on the criminalized conduct, not the
requesting State's political motives in requesting extradition, as Sacirbey argued was the
case in his situation. Id. Following the finding that he was extraditable, Sacirbey petitioned
the Southern District of New York for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. Sacirbey
v. Guccione, No. 05 Cv. 2949(BSJ)(FM), 2006 WL 2585561 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Currently, he
is appealing the denial of his writ of habeas corpus to the Second Circuit. Docket for
Sacirbey v. Guccione in the Southern District of New York, filed Mar. 17, 2005, last updated
Jan. 18, 2008.
209 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 144, at 816.
210 See supra Part II.
211 American Servicemembers Protection Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 7422 (2008); Scheffer,
Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America's OriginalIntent, supra note 90, at 344.
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1994 and 1995, respectively, which implemented transfer requirements of
the agreement adopted in 1996 authorizing U.S. surrender of indictees to
the ICTY or the ICTR.2 12
Neither the ICTY nor the ICTR are treaty-based courts, so there is a
distinction to be drawn between them and the ICC. But this distinction
between establishment of international criminal tribunals by the U.N.
213
Security Council under U.N. Charter Chapter VII enforcement authority
and by international treaty based upon State consent is irrelevant when
examining the Constitutional issues at play in the surrender process. The
Security Council-approved ICTY and ICTR statutes require U.N. Member
States to comply with the request for surrender, or transfer, of indicted
fugitives to the relevant tribunal. 2 4 To fulfill this surrender obligation, the
United States entered into an executive agreement with each tribunal, and
each such agreement is titled, "Agreement on Surrender of Persons between
the Government of the United States and the Tribunal. 21 5 The executive
agreements provide that the United States will "surrender to the
Tribunal... persons.., found in its territory whom the Tribunal has
charged with or found guilty of a violation or violations within the
competence of the Tribunal."21 6
Then, with the enactment of Section 1342 of Public Law 104-106 in
1996, Congress implemented the executive agreements for surrender of
indicted fugitives with the ICTY and the JCTR. The law provides that,
except for certain narrow exceptions, the statutory provisions related to
extradition law "shall apply in the same manner and extent to the surrender

212

The Agreement on Surrender of Persons Between the Government of the United

States and the International Tribunal for the prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other such
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Jan. 24, 1995, available at
1996 WL 165484 [hereinafter ICTR Surrender Agreement) (In 1996, Congress enacted
Public Law 104-106 to implement the Agreement. National Defense Authorization Act,
Publ L. 104-106, § 1342, 110 Stat. 486 (1996). Section 1342(a)(1) of this legislation
provides that the federal extraditions statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 3181 et seq.) shall apply to the
surrender of persons to the ICTR. This federal Statute also applies to the U.S.-ICTY
agreement. Id.); Agreement on Surrender of Persons between the Government of the United
States and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
Oct. 5, 1994, 1911 U.N.T.S. 224 [hereinafter ICTY Surrender Agreement].
213 ICTR Statute, supra note 10; ICTY Statute, supra note 9.
214 ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art 29; ICTR Statute, supra note 10, art 28.
215 ICTR Surrender Agreement, supra note 212; ICTY Surrender Agreement, supra note
212.
216

ICTR Surrender Agreement, supra note 212; ICTY Surrender Agreement, supra note
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of persons, including United States citizens, to the International Tribunal
2 17
for the former Yugoslavia or the International Tribunal for Rwanda.
The law did not preclude the possible surrender to the tribunals of U.S.
citizens indicted by either the ICTY or the ICTR for crimes committed
within the jurisdiction of either tribunal. But the issue of an indictment of a
U.S. citizen has never arisen to be challenged in the courts.
The prospect of such a surrender became a much discussed possibility
after the Kosovo campaign of 1999, when the NATO bombing of Serbia
and Kosovo gave rise to allegations of war crimes and crimes against
humanity perpetrated by the United States and other NATO allies. Some
Washington officials were surprised to learn that it was within the ICTY's
jurisdiction to charge U.S. government and military officials for the conduct
of the Kosovo campaign. One of the authors of this Article, David
Scheffer, personally heard those expressions of astonishment from
colleagues in the White House, State Department, and Pentagon, and
advised all of them that in fact, Americans were technically exposed to the
jurisdiction of the ICTY for actions taken in the former Yugoslavia. The
issue was never put to the ultimate test in policy-making circles or before
U.S. courts because no charges were ever issued. The Prosecutor's review
of the allegations resulted in a decision not to investigate the NATO
bombing campaign, and thus no American was at risk of investigation by
the ICTY with respect to that military action.2 18 In any event, the ICTY and
219
in no small measure
ICTR have significant due process protections,
because U.S. officials and lawyers were highly influential in the drafting of
the statutes and the rules of evidence and procedure for these tribunals.
Although they are not mirror images of U.S. criminal courts and do not, for
example, provide for trial by jury, they have demonstrated over years of
jurisprudence that the protection of international standards of due process
tends to dominate trial proceedings and the appeals process.22 °
The United States has had only one occasion to surrender an individual
to either the ICTY or the ICTR, and that was in the case of Elizaphan
Ntakirutimana before the ICTR.2 21 In 1994, Ntakirutimana was the
217

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,

§ 1342(a)(1). For an analysis of this law, see generally Jorge A. F. Godinho, The Surrender
Agreements between the US and the ICTY and ICTR: A Critical View, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
502 (2003); Robert Kushen & Kenneth J. Harris, Surrender of Fugitives by the United States
to the War Crimes Tribunalsfor Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 510 (1996).
218 Prosecutor's Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign, PR/ P.I.S./ 510-e, June 13,
2000, availableat http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p51 0-e.htm.
219 SCHABAS, supra note 11.
220

Id.

221

For other analyses of this case, see Mary Coombs, In re Surrenderof Ntakirutimana,

184 F.3d 419. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 94 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 171 (1999)
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president of the Seventh Day Adventist Church in Mugonero, Rwanda.222
An ethnic Hutu, he was accused of inviting a large number of local Tutsi
people to his church compound under the pretense that it was a safe haven,
and then gathering a mob of Hutus who slaughtered these Tutsis.223 He was
charged before the ICTR with genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide,
crimes against humanity, and violations of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions. 4 Ntakirutmana was later indicted on identical charges for
banding. with an armed group around the Bisesero area of Rwanda to seek
out Tutsis and execute them.225 Following the Rwanda genocide in 1994,
Ntakirutimana fled to Laredo, Texas, where his son lived.226 The pastor
obtained a "green card" visa and lawful permanent residence in the United
States.22 7 U.S. Marshals arrested him on September 26, 1996.228
A magistrate judge for the Southern District of Texas initially refused
to sanction Ntakirutimana's surrender to the ICTR.2 29 Although the
magistrate's reasoning was quickly overturned on reconsideration by

(summarizing case and how it helps shape the debate on whether international agreements
must be pursuant to a treaty); Louis Klarevas, The Surrender of Alleged War Criminal to
International Tribunals: Examining the Constitutionality of Extradition via CongressionalExecutive Agreement, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 77 (2003) (arguing that
congressional-executive agreements are constitutional, weaving the Ntakirutimana case as an
example throughout).
222 In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 988 F. Supp. 1038, 1039 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
223 Id.
224

In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708 at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 1998).

225 Id.

Id. at *2.
227 Ntakirutimana, 988 F.Supp at 1039. The arc of rights afforded aliens grows as their
226

contacts with the United States increase, cresting in citizenship if and when naturalized; the
status of resident aliens-green card holders-is virtually identical to that of a citizen for
most constitutional purposes, the major exception being if the alien were from a hostile
nation at war with the United States. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770
(1950):
The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a
generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society. Mere lawful
presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights;
they become more extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to
become a citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization. During his
probationary residence, this Court has steadily enlarged his right against Executive deportation
except upon full and fair hearing. And, at least since 1886, we have extended to the person and
property of resident aliens important constitutional guaranties-such as the due process of law of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
(internal citation omitted).
228 Ntakirutimana,988 F.Supp at 1039.
229 Id. at 1044.
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another federal court in the Southern District of Texas, 230 his findings
reflected an exceptionally narrow view of American constitutional practice,
seemingly divorced from America's international obligations or
engagements. The magistrate court held that it lacked jurisdiction to
surrender Ntakirutimana because there was no Article II treaty between the
United States and the ICTR and because the Government had failed to
establish probable cause that Ntakirutimana committed the alleged acts.23 1
The magistrate court incorrectly reasoned that because there were no prior
examples of extradition in the absence of an Article II treaty, Congress must
have lacked the power to provide for the implementation of an executive
agreement.2 32 If there had been a request by the ICTY for an indicted
fugitive, the identical erroneous argument presumably would have been
made by the court for that tribunal, because the U.S.-ICTY relationship
likewise was established by executive agreement, not by an Article II treaty.
The court found that the Government failed to establish probable cause
because witnesses were not identified by name, there was no evidence that
the interviewers were fluent in the witnesses' native language, and the
circumstances of the interviews were not described.233
The Government re-filed its request for surrender before a different
judge in the Southern District of Texas, who granted the request. 234 This
second court held that the Executive may surrender individuals only with
authorization from Congress, but this process may take the form of an
executive agreement endorsed by implementing legislation. 35 The court

230 Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708 at *33.
231 Id.
232

Id.

233

id.
Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708 at *33 (When an extradition request is denied, the

234

only remedy available to the government is to re-file the request.).
235 Id. at *10.
The court cited Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution, "[the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls." Id. at *9.The court acknowledged that
the Executive engages in various foreign relations activities not specifically named in this
clause. Id. The court interpreted Valentine v. United States-where, under a treaty between
the United States and France stipulating that neither nation was bound to extradite its own
citizens, the Supreme Court held that the power to extradite a U.S. citizen under this treaty
"is not confided to the Executive in the absence of a treaty or legislative provision," 299 U.S.
5, 7-8 (1936)-to mean that "a statute suffices to confer authority on the President to
surrender a fugitive." Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708 at *10-11.
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also found that the Government had satisfactorily responded to
Ntakirutimana's and the prior court's evidentiary objections.23 6
Ntakirutimana timely filed a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the
order that granted the Government's request for surrender.23 7 He raised his
earlier challenges that surrender should be denied based on the lack of an
Article II treaty and the lack of probable cause, but additionally challenged
the ICTR's capability of protecting the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Constitution. 8 The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo the issue of whether
an Article II Treaty is a necessary prerequisite to surrendering a fugitive,
but came to the same conclusion as the district court. 2 39 The court reasoned
that the Executive has discretion to surrender fugitives where some
affirmative legislation provides this power, be it a treaty or statute.24 °
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court had satisfactorily
resolved the evidentiary concerns. 241 Finally, acknowledging the limited
scope of habeas review, the Fifth Circuit declined to analyze the procedures
of the ICTR,242 and reasoned that "such matters, so far as they may be

236

These evidentiary concerns were addressed, in part, by testimony of a police officer

from Holland, Arjen Mostert, who conducted several of the interviews and could attest to the
procedures. Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708 at *18. The interviews were translated by
interpreters who spoke the interviewee's native language, with the exception of one witness
who spoke fluent French. Id. at *21. Initial interviews were conducted to obtain general
information about the attacks in the region and later interviews were more specific. Id. at
*22. In accordance with the Tribunal's policy, all witnesses were assigned letters (e.g.,
Witness A, B, etc.) and not named to help protect their safety. Id. at * 18.
237 Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1999).
238 Id.
239

Id. at 424-27.

240

Id. at 425.

241

Id. at 427-30.

242The Government claimed in its reply brief that the ICTR procedures were fair, citing

an affidavit by Michael J. Matheson, who was a former Legal Adviser to the Department of
State. Government Reply to Response of Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana to Request for His
Surrender to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, In re Surrender of
Ntakirutimana, No. CIV. A. L-98-43, 1998 WL 655708 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 1998)
[hereinafter Reply Brief]. Matheson wrote in response to whether the tribunal was fair that:
[T]he establishment of the Tribunal is not inconsistent with the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 6 International Legal Materials 368 (1967) and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UHDR), G.A. Res. 271 A, U.N. Doc. A/819 (1948). Indeed the
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal of 29 June 1995, ITR/3Rev.I
provide full due process for the accused that are fully consistent with ICCPR and UDHR. These
various issues have been considered and resolved with respect to the International Criminal for
the Former Yugoslavia by the Appeals Chamber of that Tribunal (which, under the Statute for
the Rwanda Tribunal, also has jurisdiction over appeals from the Trial Chambers of the Rwanda
Tribunal).
Reply Brief, supra, at 2-3. The Government concluded in its brief that:
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pertinent, are left to the State Department, 243
which ultimately will determine
surrendered.,
be
will
appellant
the
whether
Ntakirutimana appealed the denial of his habeas petition to the
Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.244 Following certification, he was
surrendered to the ICTR on March 24, 2000 and later found guilty by the
ICTR of the crime of genocide. 245 After serving a ten-year prison sentence
(including time detained prior to conviction), he was released on December
12, 2006.246
Nothing in U.S. constitutional practice suggests that a treaty, including
an executive agreement that is validated by Act of Congress or a Senateratified treaty that requires implementing legislation for its full
enforcement, cannot require an international criminal court's judgments to
be recognized in the same manner as the courts have upheld the
enforceability of judgments by a foreign criminal court. The United States
was instrumental in the creation of the ICC and the drafting of the ICC's
constitutional documents, as reflected in the Rome Statute, the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, and the Elements of Crimes. This suggests that
the relatively low bar established in U.S. courts for enforcement of
judgments by various foreign criminal courts as well as a robust U.S.
extradition practice that refuses to probe the due process standards of
foreign criminal courts, including those prosecuting extradited U.S.
citizens, makes the highly sophisticated structure of the ICC and its
thorough attention to due process rights of defendants acceptable on
constitutional grounds. Such an outcome is due in no small part to the role
of U.S. negotiators in ensuring that such rights exist in the ICC's
constitutional documents,247 an opportunity rarely present in the more
conventional experiences of enforcing foreign court criminal judgments or
extraditing aliens or U.S. citizens to criminal trials in foreign courts of
dubious character.

[T]he United States has been in the forefront of efforts to create an international mechanism
and to persuade other nations to cooperate with the Tribunals. Our participation in these efforts
reflects our international responsibilities and is important to our foreign policy objectives. It is

also fully consistent with the Constitution ....

Id.

243 Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 430 (quoting Garcia-Guillen v. United States, 450 F.2d
1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971)).
244 Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 528 U.S. 1135 (2000).
245 See

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Summary of Judgment, Case No.

ICTR 96-10-T & ICTR 96-17-T (Feb. 21, 2003), http://69.94.11.53/default.htm.
246 Ntakirutimana died on January 22, 2007.
International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Status of Detainees, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm.
247

See Part

VII,

infra.
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D. THE MEDELLIN RULING

The Supreme Court recently ruled on the scope of the treaty power
under the Constitution in Medellin v. Texas. 248 As tempting as it may be for
skeptics of the constitutionality of the Rome Statute to cite the Medellin
ruling, it not only is distinguishable from the issues confronting the Rome
Statute but it also confirms that proper implementing legislation can ensure
the enforceability of such a treaty in U.S. federal and state courts.
The majority opinion in Medellin, written by Chief Justice John
Roberts, confirmed that non-self-executing treaties require domestic
implementing legislation in order to be enforceable in federal and state
courts of the United States. 49 Much of the dispute in Medellin centered on
whether the Optional Protocol Concerning the Settlement of Disputes to the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the United Nations Charter, and
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are all self-executing
treaties or whether each requires additional implementing legislation that
would create enforceable obligations, particularly for judgments rendered
by the ICJ. The Court acknowledged that these treaties are international
law obligations of the United States, "But not all [such] obligations
automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States
courts., 250 The Court discovered no implementing legislation for any of the
three treaties and also concluded that by their terms they were not selfexecuting.25' In particular, through interpretation of treaty language,
248

128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). Shortly after the Supreme Court decision, the State of Texas

executed Jos6 Medellin by lethal injection. James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Executes Man
Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A19.
2149Medellin,

128

S. Ct. at 1356 n.2 ("What we mean by 'self-executing' is that the treaty

has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification. Conversely, a 'non-selfexecuting' treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law.
Whether such a treaty has domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by
Congress.").
25 Id. at 1356. Justice Roberts then cited Fosterv. Neilson, "which held that a treaty is
'equivalent to an act of the legislature,' and hence self-executing, when it operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision."' Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 25, 314 (1829),
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 87 (1833). Justice

Roberts continued: "When, in contrast, '[treaty] stipulations are not self-executing they can
only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect."' Id., citing Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). "In sum, while treaties 'may comprise international
commitments.., they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and
is ratified on these terms." Id. (citing Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145,
150 (1st Cir. 2005)).
251 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 n.4:
Consequently, it is unnecessary to resolve whether the Vienna Convention is itself "selfexecuting" or whether it grants Medellin individually enforceable rights... [W]e thus assume,
without deciding, that Article 36 [of the Vienna Convention] grants foreign nationals "an
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particularly Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter,252 the Court concluded that
implementing legislation would be required for automatic enforcement of
ICJ judgments in U.S. and state courts and, since such legislation was
lacking, the state of Texas was not required to enforce the ICJ's judgment
253
in The Case ConcerningAvena and Other Mexican Nationals.
The Rome Statute is a treaty that requires, far more than most treaties,
a considerable body of implementing legislation in order for the United
States to cooperate with the ICC, respond fully to its requests for assistance,
pay its annual assessments, enforce the ICC's judgments when necessary,
incarcerate convicted persons in national penal institutions, and, perhaps
most importantly for constitutional purposes, undertake all of the judicial
tasks that the complementarity regime offers a nation in order to avoid ICC
jurisdiction over its citizens and others falling within national jurisdiction.
It would be inconceivable for the United States to join the ICC without
implementing legislation that extends federal jurisdiction over all of the
atrocity crimes within the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction, establishes the
precise procedures for cooperation with the ICC (particularly Part 9 of the
Rome Statute), and requires states to comply with federal and ICC requests
for assistance pursuant to the Rome Statute. Many State Parties, including
Canada, Mexico, and European and Latin American nations, have adopted
complex implementing legislation that amends their criminal codes and
establishes procedures for cooperation with the ICC.114 No less, and

individually enforceable right to request that their consular officers be notified of their detention,
and an accompanying right to be informed by authorities of the availability of consular
notification."

(internal citations omitted).
252 Id. at 1358 ("Article 94(1) provides that '[e]ach Member of the United Nations

undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party."'
(citing the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention or Convention),

Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, 59 Stat. 1051") (emphasis in original).
253Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12 (Mar. 31). See also Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1365:
Our holding does not call into question the ordinary enforcement of foreign judgments or
international arbitral agreements .... The dissent worries that our decision casts doubt on some
70-odd treaties under which the United States has agreed to submit disputes to the ICJ according
to "roughly similar" provisions. Again, under our established precedent, some treaties are selfexecuting and some are not, depending on the treaty. That the judgment of an international
tribunal might not automatically become domestic law hardly means that the underlying treaty is
,useless.' Such judgments would still constitute international obligations, the proper subject of
political and diplomatic negotiations. And Congress could elect to give them wholesale
effect ...through implementing legislation, as it regularly has.

254 For example, Canada implemented the Rome Statute domestically with its Crimes
Against Humanity & War Crimes Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 24; see DFAIT, Canada and the
International Criminal Court, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignpolicy/icc/canada-iccen.asp (last visited Aug. 5, 2008). For a summary of the UK and some other European
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perhaps much more, would be required of the U.S. Congress and the
President before the United States would join the ICC.
The Rome Statute is actually an extreme example of what a non-selfexecuting treaty might require in the form of implementing legislation in
order to be enforceable in a domestic judicial system. Thus the majority
ruling in Medellin, regardless of the merits of the strong dissenting opinion
written by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg, 255 only reinforces the reality of what will be required for U.S.
ratification of the Rome Statute. The judgment does not diminish the
fundamental tenets of the Constitution's treaty power and the options
available to the next president to forge ahead towards full participation in
the critical work of the ICC.
V. THE ARTICLE I DEFINE AND PUNISH CLAUSE As CONSTITUTIONAL
GROUNDS FOR RATIFICATION OF THE ROME STATUTE

The Constitution is a document of enumerated powers, and there is a
very powerful one that often goes unnoticed. Article I, Section 8, Clause 10
of the Constitution grants Congress the power to "define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations., 25 6 Particularly with respect to atrocity crimes, it would be
an entirely logical and warranted exercise of such constitutional power to
create, in concert with other governments, an international criminal court
that defines, prosecutes, and punishes such incontrovertible "Offences
against the Law of Nations," namely, atrocity crimes, and to legislate that
such an international court's judgments and sentences be given effect in the
United States to the same extent as they are recognized by and enforced in
other State Parties to the Rome Statute.257

countries, see David Turns, Aspects of National Implementation of the Rome Statute: The
United Kingdom and Selected Other States, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 337, 340 (Dominic McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004); for a

review of Latin American implementation of the Rome Statute, see Hugo Relva, The
Implementation of the Rome Statute in Latin American States, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 331

(2003).
255 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1376 ("I believe the treaty obligations, and hence the
judgment, resting as it does upon the consent of the United States to the ICJ's jurisdiction,
bind the courts no less than would 'an act of the [federal] legislature."') (Breyer, J.
dissenting).
256 Congress has used the Clause as a power to enact legislation in the Alien Torts
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1994).
257 For a discussion of how the Offenses Clause can and should be applied, see Beth
Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress' Power to 'Define and
Punish... Offenses Against the Laws of Nations,' 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2000);
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What was regarded as the "Law of Nations" at the signing of the
Constitution is now embodied in, and vastly expanded by, modem
"customary international law., 25 8 There is considerable debate as to the
scope of the Define and Punish Clause.2 59 Yet, there is consensus that the
Clause confers power to govern the conduct of individuals who transgress
enabling Congress to enact legislation and create
international law 26by
0
criminal tribunals.
That the Define and Punish Clause enables Congress to establish
criminal tribunals is of direct relevance to American participation in the
ICC. The Supreme Court cited the Define and Punish Clause in Quirin as
support for the military tribunal to try German spies, one of whom was a
U.S. citizen:

Michael T.Morley, Note, The Law of Nations and the Offenses Clause of the Constitution:A
Defense of Federalism, 112 YALE L.J. 109 (2002).
258 Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 237 (2d ed.
1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41
(1987): INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO CHAPTER 2 (1990) ("[T]he law of nations, [was] later
referred to as international law."); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 815, 819 (1997); J. Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-AppreciatedPower to Define
and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REv. 843, 845 (2007) (citing
Flores v. S. Peru Cooper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003)); Stephens, supra note 257, at
449; but see Morley, supra note 257, at 118 ("[T]he phrase 'law of nations,' as understood
by the Framers and used in the Constitution, is not synonymous with "international
law".... [T]he law of nations governs actual interactions between countries, and by
extension between their citizens, in discrete areas such as war, trade, navigation, and
diplomacy.").
259 E.g., Stephens, supra note 257 (arguing that the Define and Punish Clause authorizes
Congress to legislate over civil and criminal matters and that the laws of nations is an
evolving construct that can include domestic matters); contra Morley, supra note 257
(agreeing that the Define and Punish Clause empowers Congress to legislate over criminal
and civil matters, but disagreeing with Stephens that customary international law means
anything but what the Founding Fathers considered, i.e., navigation, trade, war and
diplomacy).
260 [T]he first category [of congressional invocations of the Define and Punish Clause]
include.., congressional action regarding military tribunals discussed in the World War ll-era
cases Ex parte Quirin and In re Yamashita. The Military Commissions Act of 2006, establishing
tribunals to try alleged al-Qaeda members for violations of international law, was enacted
pursuant to the Law of Nations Clause.
Kent, supra note 258, at 861-62 (2007); see also Morley, supra note 257, at 137-38 (citing
interpretations of the Define and Punish Clause that empower Congress to "establish military
commissions to try violations of the law of war"); Stephens, supra note 258, at 478-79
(explaining that Congress cited the Define and Punish Clause as authority to establish a
military commission at issue in Ex parte Quirin and that the Supreme Court "found
Congress' actions within the reach of the [Define and Punish] Clause.") (citing Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
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Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that
military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of
war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of
our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the
jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to
law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are
the rules and precepts of the 261
cognizable by such tribunals.

U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute would constitute an exercise by
Congress of its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of
nations, that is, customary international law, by sanctioning the jurisdiction
of the ICC to try persons for atrocity crimes. The Define and Punish Clause
was clearly intended to have direct consequence for U.S. citizens as well as
aliens falling within the jurisdiction of the United States. The primary
means by which Congress can exercise its authority to "punish offenses
against the law of nations" is to ensure that courts are empowered to
prosecute such crimes. The Define and Punish Clause of the Constitution
does not limit the power to punish only to Article III courts. 26a It presents
the option to Congress to establish non-Article III courts and tribunals in
connection with the punishment of offenses against the law of nations.
A few years after Quirin, the Define and Punish Clause was used to
support the creation of a military tribunal in occupied Japan.263 Decades
later the military commissions created to prosecute Guantanamo detainees
were based on the precedent of Quirin and, thus indirectly upon the Define
Although not cited as such in any of the
and Punish Clause. 264
Ntakirutimana federal rulings, certain scholars consider the clause to be
261
262

Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an

International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 129-31 (1995) (discussing
the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials as persuasive authority for a permanent International
Criminal Court that would not be created pursuant to Article III).
263 In In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946), the Court explained:
In Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, we had occasion to consider at length the sources and nature
of the authority to create military commissions for the trial of enemy combatants for offenses
against the law of war. We there pointed out that Congress, in the exercise of the power
conferred upon it by art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 10 of the Constitution to "define and punish ... Offenses
against the Law of Nations... ," of which the law of war is a part, had by the Articles of War
(10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 1471-1593) recognized the "military commission"
appointed by military command, as it had previously existed in United States Army practice, as
an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war.
264

See, e.g., The Petitioner's Reply Brief at 11-13, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557

(2006) ("Hamdan does not argue that alternative tribunals cannot be created to try cases
arising from this new conflict. He simply argues that any such extension-with all its
complications and balancing of fundamental interests-must be taken by Congress under its
Article I power to, inter alia, define and punish such offenses.").
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authority for the surrender of indicted fugitives to the ICTY and ICTR
pursuant to the agreements approved by Congress between the United
States and the ICTY and ICTR.265
If the Define and Punish Clause has justified the creation of military
tribunals and has legitimized U.S. cooperation in surrender arrangements
with the ICTY and ICTR, then this constitutional provision should be
persuasive legal authority for U.S. participation in the ICC. The Supreme
Court in both Quirin and Yamashita noted that "the law of war" is but one
example of the "laws of nations. 2 66 Other laws of nations include those
atrocity crimes confirmed in customary international law that form the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, namely, genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and aggression, although the latter crime is
neither defined nor enforceable yet for ICC purposes. The Define and
Punish Clause thus provides an additional constitutional pillar, together
with the treaty power, that supports the constitutionality of U.S.
participation in the ICC.
However, the Define and Punish Clause may compel a rethinking of
how the United States should enter into the Rome Statute. It may be that a
congressional-executive agreement would be the most pragmatic means by
which the U.S. should ratify the Rome Statute. This would enable the full
Congress, both the Senate and the House of Representatives, to approve
U.S. participation in the ICC in satisfaction of the Define and Punish
Clause. As additional constitutional insurance, the president could ask the
Senate to render a two-thirds vote on the measure and to define its measure
as an approval for ratification as well as a joint resolution with the House of
Representatives. This would satisfy any concerns about whether the
ratification fully complies with the treaty power. This will be discussed
further below.
VI. LIMITS TO THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
Any defendant coming before the ICC appears before a chamber of
judges and not before a jury.267 Nothing in the U.S. Constitution requires a
foreign or international court located outside of the United States to hold its
criminal trials before juries of common law character, as opposed to the far
more prevalent means of trial before judges that is found in most of the

265Klarevas, supra note 221, at 119-24.
266 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29-30; Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7.
267 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 39, 64.
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world's civil law legal systems.268 But the Constitution's provisions on jury
trials present a considerable challenge to any prospective U.S. ratification of
the Rome Statute.
The Constitution requires in Article III, Section 2 that, "The Trial of
all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. 2 69 The Fifth
Amendment provides that "No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury.. ,270 The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law ... .,,271 The Article III, Section 2 requirement and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments contain the most serious, and also the most sweeping,
invocations regarding the right to trial by jury.
We begin with two fundamental statements of principle about the
significance of the right to trial by jury. Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia has written, "When the Court deals with the content of this guarantee
[to a trial by impartial jury]-the only one to appear in both the body of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights-it is operating upon the spinal column
of American democracy. 27 2 The Supreme Court, in the Milligan case
discussed below, ruled that "another guarantee of freedom was broken" by
the lack of ajury in Milligan's trial:
[U]ntil recently no one ever doubted that the right of trial by jury was fortified in
the organic law against the power of attack. It is now assailed; but if ideas can be
expressed in words, and language has any meaning, this right--one of the most
valuable in a free country-is preserved to every one accused
of crime who is not
27 3
attached to the army, or navy, or militia in actual service.

The Court further explained, "citizens of states where the courts are open, if
charged with crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial by jury.
This privilege is a vital principle, underlying the whole administration of
274
criminal justice.,

268

For instance, as explained in Part IV(B), supra, the United States routinely extradites

non-citizens and citizens to civil law countries that do not operate with trials by jury. See
generally, BASSIOUNI, supra note 76, at 604-42, 738-45.
269 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.
270 U.S. CONST.

amend. V.

amend. VI.
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

271 U.S. CONST.
272

dissenting in part).
273 Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (1866) (emphasis in original).
274

Id.
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The Rome Statute offers, through the complementarity principle, full
adherence to these strictures regarding a U.S. citizen who is not a member
of the armed services or otherwise an enemy combatant, and who is charged
with an atrocity crime of the ICC. Certainly, in the unlikely event that the
atrocity crime is committed on U.S. territory, any concern about a U.S.
national being tried at the ICC before judges, as opposed to before a U.S.
jury, can be overcome with a jury trial in a U.S. court in full satisfaction of
the Constitution and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by exercising the
privilege of complementarity under the Rome Statute. If the U.S. national
commits the atrocity crime on foreign territory, the Sixth Amendment
becomes irrelevant since it requires an impartial jury from the "State or
district wherein the crime shall have been committed., 275 There can be no
other interpretation of such language than to mean "State or district" within
the United States.
However, the Article III, Section 2 and Fifth Amendment requirements
of trial by jury should control if a U.S. national who is not a member of the
armed forces or an enemy combatant commits an atrocity crime outside the
United States, such atrocity crime is criminalized under U.S. law, and U.S.
statutory law applies extraterritorial jurisdiction over its citizens who
commit such U.S. crimes overseas. But for such extraterritorial jurisdiction
to be enforced by the courts, the U.S. citizen must fall within the physical
custody of U.S. authorities and appear on U.S. territory to stand trial before
a jury. If such physical custody cannot be achieved, and the U.S. citizen
remains on foreign territory or in the custody of foreign law enforcement
authorities to stand trial overseas for commission of the atrocity crime, then
the U.S. national obviously is not entitled to trial by jury before whatever
foreign court prosecutes him. The Rome Statute holds out the possibility
that a U.S. citizen would be captured outside the United States and charged
with committing an atrocity crime outside the United States, and that he or
she either would be prosecuted by a foreign national court (perhaps
exercising its own complementarity privilege under the Rome Statute) or
surrendered to the ICC to stand trial there if he or she is presented with
charges by the ICC. The foreign court may use the jury trial system, but
most foreign courts do not. The ICC does not use juries. There would be
no violation of the U.S. Constitution in any of these scenarios.
There are situations in the history of U.S. constitutional law where not
all of the due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution for criminal
trials, including the right to trial by jury, are in fact enforced by U.S. courts
even though the U.S. government is engaged in some way with the criminal

275 U.S. CONST. art.

VI.
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prosecution.27 6 It is entirely possible that an ICC trial of a U.S. citizen
following a complementarity effort would not precisely duplicate each and
every constitutionally-guaranteed due process right that would have been
enforced in a U.S. courtroom. Certain World War II and so-called war on
terror cases in U.S. courts (particularly the Supreme Court) regarding
"unlawful enemy combatants" who are also U.S. citizens offer some
guidance in this respect. 277 The conclusion presented by these cases is that

a jury trial can be denied in instances where a U.S. citizen who is a member
of the armed forces is tried before a military tribunal or where a U.S.
citizen, who need not be a member of the armed forces but is designated as
an enemy combatant, is prosecuted before a military commission
established by the president and lacking a jury. If the U.S. citizen is a
civilian, then there is a constitutional right to a jury trial for any crime
committed in the United States, although the Milligan case would require
that the federal courts be open for business (a most likely scenario) to
guarantee the trial by jury, as opposed to a military commission trial which
may not have a jury.
The Supreme Court, in the case of Ex parte Milligan, considered
whether a U.S. citizen may be tried for crimes without a jury trial in a
military tribunal, even though shortly after the Civil War, the federal courts
were fully functioning. 278 The Court concluded that a U.S. citizen, Lamdin
P. Milligan, was entitled to a jury trial, but for reasons that are
distinguishable from the situation that would arise for a U.S. citizen tried
before the ICC pursuant to U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute.279
Milligan was a resident of Indiana, 280 a state that was part of the Union
during the Civil War and was under threat of invasion by rebel forces from
the Confederacy. 281 He was alleged to be a part of a secret society with the
aim of overthrowing the government and was charged with conspiring
against the government, aiding rebels, inciting insurrection, disloyal
practices, and violating the laws of war.282 After Milligan was found guilty
by a military tribunal and sentenced to hang, the Supreme Court heard

276

E.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (U.S. military tribunal tried Japanese

general); see infra notes 324-46 and accompanying text (analyzing case law where
defendants were denied due process rights, including the right to trial by jury, even though
the U.S. government was a party).
277 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942).
278 Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (1866).
279 Id.
280 Id. at 107.
281 Id. at 126-27.
282 Id. at 6-7.
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acknowledged that the privilege of petitioning for the writ of habeas corpus
was properly suspended during the Civil War.284 Nevertheless, the Court
found that the federal courts had jurisdiction to consider Milligan's habeas
petition.285
The Supreme Court considered whether the military tribunal that
convicted Milligan had the "legal power and authority to try and punish this
man., 286 The Court reasoned that, "it is the birthright of every American
citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and punished according to
law. 287 The Court considered, in turn, what judicial power the military
tribunal had to try Milligan.288 Because the tribunal was not authorized or
established by Congress, it was not an Article III court. 28 9 Further, the
Court reasoned that the Constitution "is a law for rulers and people," so the
President's executive power could not empower the military tribunal for the
trial of a U.S. citizen without an act of Congress. 290 Finally, the Court
considered whether the tribunal had jurisdiction under the "law and usages
of war., 291 The Court held that military law "can never be applied to
citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the 292
government, and
where the courts are open and their process unobstructed.,
The Supreme Court thus indirectly confirmed that military trials of
military personnel need not be conducted by use of a jury.2 93 The Court's
confirmation that a U.S. citizen who is not in military service is entitled to
trial by jury rested on the two key factors-one unspoken and the other
directly addressed.
First, Milligan's alleged crime occurred on U.S.
territory, namely, in the state of Indiana.294 The Court was not examining
the right to jury trial for crimes committed outside the United States, which
probably would be the case if a U.S. citizen is ever brought before the ICC,
preceded by the collapse or disuse of complementarity procedures in the
283
284

Id. at 107-09.
Id. at 115.

285 "The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the
writ itself. The writ issues as a matter of course; and on the return made to it the court
decides whether the party applying is denied the right of proceeding any further with it." Id.
at 131.
286 Id. at 118 (emphasis in original).
287 Id. at 119.
288 Id. at 119-30.
289 Id. at 122.

291 Id. at 120.
291 Id. at 76.
292 Id.
293 See EUGENE R. FIDELL ET AL., MILITARY JUSTICE CASES AND MATERIALS

294 71 U.S. 2, 127.

687 (2007).
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United States. Second, the Court emphasized that domestic courts were
295
open and thus available for trial by jury of a civilian citizen.
In the context of the ICC, the complementarity principle encourages
using national courts, particularly if they are functioning and open for
business, and thus trial by jury would be available for any U.S. citizen who
is a civilian and physically drawn into the personal jurisdiction of a federal
court. The Supreme Court assumed that the crime for which Milligan was
charged could be prosecuted under domestic law.296 In the case of the ICC,
unless federal law is amended to incorporate all of the Rome Statute's
atrocity crimes (as we believe it should be), the ability of a federal court to
prosecute a U.S. citizen for a particular atrocity crime may be severely
impaired. Thus the easy retreat to domestic courts that was evident in the
Milligan judgment can be distinguished from the reality of what would
confront a U.S. civilian charged with an atrocity crime. Such a crime may,
under the complementarity principle, trigger domestic jurisdiction where
trial by jury would be sustained. Alternatively, the act may, in the absence
of a prosecutable crime in federal (or for that matter, state) courts, entitle
the ICC to seek custody of the U.S. indictee for trial in The Hague without a
jury. If the U.S. citizen is a member of the armed forces, where trial by jury
is not guaranteed, then the Milligan precedent would be particularly
supportive of U.S. participation in the ICC where a trial by jury will not
exist.
In the case of Ex parte Quirin,297 the Supreme Court revisited, during
WWII, the issue of habeas corpus petitions and of right to trial by jury of
alleged government enemies. 298 Although this case followed Milligan, the
Court found that the petitioners were not to be afforded trials by jury,
because these petitioners, unlike petitioner Milligan, were unlawful

295 Id. ("It is difficult to see how the safety for the country required martial law in

Indiana. If any of her citizens were plotting treason, the power of arrest could secure them,
until the government was prepared for their trial, when the courts were open and ready to try
them.") (emphasis in original).
296 Id.
297 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
298 The petitioners had attended sabotage school in Germany, traveled to the United
States aboard submarines, landed on the Atlantic coast, and were found in plain clothes
without uniforms. Id. at 21. The FBI arrested them. Id. Petitioners were charged and set to
be tried in a military tribunal, following a Presidential Proclamation that:
[T]hose who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States... through coastal
or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit
sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to
the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals.
Id. at 22-23.
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combatants. 299 The Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]he Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, while guaranteeing the continuance of certain incidents of
trial by jury which Article III, [Section] 2 had left unmentioned, did not
enlarge the right to jury trial as it had been established by that Article."30 0
The Court recognized that the practice of trying unlawful combatants before
military tribunals had a history that predated the Constitution's drafting and
continued during the Mexican and Civil Wars. 30 1 The Court then described
302
a series of situations in which offenses are triable without a jury.
Because there "are instances of offenses committed against the United
States, for which a penalty is imposed, but they are not deemed to be within
Article 1II, [Section] 2 or the provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
relating to 'crimes' and 'criminal prosecutions,"' the Court further reasoned
that:
[W]e must conclude that [Section] 2 of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by
military commission,
that offenses
against
. .. or to have required .
. .
303 the law of war not
triable by jury at common law be tried only in the civil courts.

All petitioners in Ex parte Quirin had at some point in their lives
resided in the United States, 30 4 and one was a U.S. citizen,30 5 yet this gave
3 6
them no right to a trial by jury in light of their unlawful combatant status.

The petitioners argued that they were "entitled to be tried in civil courts
with the safeguards, including trial by jury, which the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments guarantee to all persons charged in such courts with criminal
offenses. 30 7 The Court noted that:
Since the [Fifth and Sixth] Amendments, like section 2 of Article III, do not
preclude all trials of offenses against the law of war by military commission without a
jury when the offenders are aliens not members of our Armed Forces, it is plain that

291

Id. at 36-48.

30 Id. at 39.
3"' Id. at 31.
302 [P]etty offenses triable at common law without a jury may be tried without a jury in the
federal courts, notwithstanding Article Ill, § 2, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Trial by
jury of criminal contempts may constitutionally be dispensed with in the federal courts in those

cases in which they could be tried without a jury at common law. Similarly, an action for debt to
enforce a penalty inflicted by Congress is not subject to the constitutional restrictions upon
criminal prosecutions.
Id. at 39-40 (internal citations omitted).
303 Id. at 40.
'04 Id. at 20.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 20-48.
307 Id. at 24.
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they present no greater obstacle to the trial in like30 8manner of citizen enemies who
have violated the law of war applicable to enemies.

The Court distinguished the petitioners' case with Milligan by pointing
out that Milligan was not an enemy belligerent and so could not be an
unlawful combatant. 30 9 3Thus,
the Court found that the charged offenses did
10
not require trial by jury.
Quirin and to an extent Milligan have been key precedents in recent
habeas corpus petitions made during the so-called war on terror since
2001.311 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, petitioner Hamdi-an American citizenwas arrested in Afghanistan during active warfare in the region. 3 12 He was
categorized as an enemy combatant and held in detention at a military
base.3 13 Hamdi sought to challenge his status as an enemy combatant, a
status that the government argued justifies holding someone without
charging him or her with a crime. 314 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who
wrote for the majority, framed the issue as "the narrow question ...[of]
whether the detention of citizens falling within the definition [of enemy
combatant] is authorized."315 A majority of the Court found that Congress
authorized Hamdi's detention through the authorization for use of military
force, which had "authorize[d] the President to use all necessary and
appropriate force against nations, organizations, or persons associated with
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. 3 16 The Court addressed Hamdi's
308 Id. at 44.
309 Id.at 45.
310 Id.at 45-48.

311The body of cases involving American citizen Jose Padilla are not mentioned in the
text of this Part because he was ultimately tried in an Article III court, and thus his case in
not completely apposite to this Part's discussion. The Executive avoided a Supreme Court
review of the President's power to hold Padilla indefinitely without charging him, a power
the Executive argued arose from the President's determination that Padilla was an unlawful
enemy combatant. Hanfi v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006) (approving the Government's
request for authorization to transfer Padilla to a federal detention center); Padilla v. Hanf,
432 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2005) (denying the government's motion to transfer Padilla to federal
custody because the purpose of the motion seemed to be to avoid Supreme Court review of
the issues in this case and these issues were too important to permit the government such
last-minute evasion of review). On the eve of such a test, the Executive requested that
Padilla be transferred to federal court for criminal trial, and the Supreme Court approved.
Hanfi, 546 U.S. 1084; see Eric Lichtblau, Justices are Asked to Permit Padilla Move, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2005, at A16.
312 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
313 Id. at 510-11.
314 Id. at 509-11.
315 Id. at 516.
316 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (citing Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. 1451 (2001))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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citizenship and found that "there is no bar to this Nation's holding one of its
own citizens as an enemy combatant., 317 The Court cited Quirin to support
this proposition and distinguished Milligan based on the fact that Milligan
was not a prisoner of war.31 8
Bound by the Due Process Clause but balancing Hamdi's due process
interest against the competing interest of the political branches' war powers,
a majority of the Supreme Court held that Hamdi must "receive notice of
the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the
319
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.
Notably, the Court did not require all of the due process rights that would
normally be available in a criminal trial prosecuted by the United States
government. For instance, the Court ruled:
Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available
evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution
would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government's evidence, so
long as that presumption
remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal
320
were provided.

These cases show that U.S. citizens are not afforded the full protection
of the Constitution at all times. Hamdi and at least one petitioner in Quirin
were American citizens, yet this status did not afford these citizens full due
process rights or a jury trial. These citizens were classified as enemy
combatants, and more controversially as "unlawful" enemy combatants, and
thus further isolated from traditional constitutional protections.
As part of its ratification of the Rome Statute, the United States could
attach a declaration requiring that any U.S. national charged by the ICC,
particularly for an atrocity crime committed in the United States, would be
investigated and, if merited, prosecuted before a U.S. court by jury trial.
For crimes occurring within the United States, such a condition would help
ensure compliance with the Sixth Amendment. However, if the United
States fails to implement its complementarity rights under the Rome Statute
for an atrocity crime committed on U.S. territory, it would remain possible
317 Id. at 519 (going on to cite Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
318 Id. at 519, 521-22.

Id. at 533.

The majority decision was written by Justice O'Connor, joined by
Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in
part because they also rejected any limit on the exercise of habeas jurisdiction, and dissented
from the idea that if Hamdi is properly considered an enemy combatant that his detention is
authorized by an Act of Congress, but concurred in the judgment that Hamdi should have
some opportunity to show that he is not an enemy combatant. Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Stevens, dissented because they would grant the habeas petition and release Hamdi
from military custody. Justice Thomas dissented because he would not place due process
burdens on the political branches in wartime.
320 Id.
319

1042

DAVID SCHEFFER& ASHLEY COX

[Vol. 98

to surrender a U.S. citizen to the ICC in compliance with U.S. obligations
under the Rome Statute. The declaration attached to the ratification
instrument could set forth the procedures, similar to extradition practice,
which would have to be satisfied before a U.S. citizen would be surrendered
to the ICC by the Secretary of State. If the crime occurs outside of the
United States, the same complementarity option for a jury trial would apply.
But if the United States fails to achieve custody of the U.S. national, then
there is no presumption of the right to jury trial in the event the U.S.
national charged with such crime is prosecuted before the ICC or, for that
matter, a foreign court. In the latter case, no opportunity would have arisen
to activate the U.S. citizen's constitutional rights because the individual
would have acted and remained on foreign territory and thus subject to a
foreign government's national criminal court system and its own
participation in the ICC, with the foreign State's attendant obligation to
surrender the individual for trial to the ICC if the State decides not to
investigate and prosecute him or her domestically.
The Constitution does not necessarily follow U.S. citizens who commit
crimes abroad. In Reid v. Covert,321 the Supreme Court held in a plurality
opinion that two military wives charged with the murder of their husbands
were improperly tried in court-martial proceedings. Dicta in the opinion
written by Justice Black stated:
[W]hen the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield
which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life
and liberty should not be stripped away simply because he happens to be in another
land.... Trial by jury in a court of law and in accordance with traditional modes of
procedure after an indictment by grand jury has served and remains one of our most
vital barriers to government arbitrariness.

Justice Harlan, however, wrote in concurrence:
I do not think it can be said that these safeguards [constitutional guarantees in an
Article III court, including indictment by grand jury and jury trial] of the Constitution
are never operative without the United States, regardless of the particular
circumstances ... [o]n the other hand, I cannot agree with the suggestion that every
provision of the Constitution must always3 2be
deemed automatically applicable to
3
American citizens in every part of the world.

Justice Harlan relied, in part, on the Insular cases to support this
proposition. These cases, discussed in further detail below, generally held
that certain due process rights, including the right to trial by jury, were not

321354 U.S. 1 (1957).
322 Id. at 10; The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations also adopts this approach.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721 (1987).

12' 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
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constitutional requisites in territories that the United States had acquired but
not yet fully incorporated (e.g., the Philippines and Puerto Rico).324
Putting aside for a moment Justice Harlan's middle ground
interpretation of applicable Supreme Court precedent, if the dicta quoted
from Justice Black above were taken at face value, this means that when the
United States punishes a citizen who commits a crime outside the United
States, then the United States may not strip the criminally accused of
Constitutional protections. This is a very different circumstance than when
a foreign or internationalcriminal court obtains custody of and prosecutes
a U.S. citizen for the commission of any atrocity crime, for in that event the
U.S. citizen is not entitled to the protections of the Constitution, particularly
the right to a jury trial. Had the murders at issue in Reid v. Covert not
occurred on a U.S. military base, the foreign country in which each murder
occurred (the United Kingdom or Japan) would have had primary
jurisdiction not only under the Status of Forces Agreement but also under
basic principles of territorial jurisdiction, and could have requested
extradition had the defendant returned to the United States.
Similarly, if a U.S. national or resident alien commits an atrocity crime
falling within ICC jurisdiction but outside the United States, that individual
could be surrendered to the ICC by U.S. authorities if the United States is a
State Party to the Rome Statute and fails or refuses to exercise its
complementarity privilege to prosecute before a jury in a U.S. courtroom.
As explained in Part I, the U.S. government has the first opportunity to
investigate an atrocity crime committed by its citizens and provide a jury
trial, if trial is warranted, in full accordance with Article III and the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments. If the United States chooses to waive its right to
investigate, and the ICC claims jurisdiction, this hypothetical fact scenario
is analogous to an extradition case wherein a U.S. citizen commits a crime
outside the territory of the U.S. and under a foreign court's jurisdiction.
Both the treaty power and well-settled
extradition practices support the
325
surrender of such a citizen to the ICC.
Recently, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court revisited Reid v.
Covert and emphasized the relevance of "practical considerations" to the
majority's determination that the two military wives were entitled to trial by
jury.326 The majority in Boumediene327 explained that in Reid the Court had
324

These cases were distinguished by the majority as having nothing to do with

extending military jurisdiction over civilians. 354 U.S. at 14.
325 See generally Bassiouni, supra note 76, 738-45 (5th ed. 2007) (examining extradition
of U.S. citizens to foreign courts).
326 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
327 Even Justice Scalia, who vigorously dissented in Boumediene, did not dispute this
central point-that there is no automatic right to jury trial with respect to U.S. citizens who
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relied upon In re Ross, 328 which they "properly understood ...as standing
for the proposition that, at least in some circumstances, the jury provisions
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments have no application to American
citizens tried by American authorities abroad., 329 The fact of U.S.
citizenship was not dispositive for determining trial by jury. Rather,
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter, in concurring opinions, looked to the
practical considerations that made jury trial the "more feasible option for
[the military wives] than it was for the petitioner in Ross [who was a British
citizen but the Court held he should be treated as if he were a U.S. citizen].
If citizenship had been the only relevant factor in the case, it would have
been necessary for the Court to overturn Ross, something Justices Harlan
and Frankfurter were unwilling to do. 330 Practical considerations abound
in any case that would arise before the ICC. In light of the principle of
complementarity, one can envisage many different scenarios where a U.S.
citizen acting abroad (and of interest to the ICC Prosecutor) may be within
reach of federal court jurisdiction, but many where he or she would not be
subject either to federal jurisdiction or entitled to a jury trial under U.S. law.
In this line of cases, as amplified by Boumediene, the Supreme Court has
left the door open for a case-by-case examination of when and under what
circumstances (guided by "practical considerations") a U.S. citizen acting
outside the United States would be entitled to a jury trial before American
authorities seeking to try the case abroad.
Notwithstanding certain sweeping language of Reid v. Covert, even
when the U.S. government acts abroad, it need not always apply every
provision of the Constitution. The Insular cases, 331 which pre-dated Reid v.
Covert and are still good law, generally hold that the U.S. government must
only uphold fundamental due process rights when acting in unincorporated
but occupied territories. In both Dorr v. United States332 and Ocampo v.
United States,3 33 the Supreme Court held that the government did not need
to provide jury trials in the acquired but unincorporated Philippines. The
Philippines had their own Bill of Rights, modeled in large part on the U.S.
Bill of Rights. These rights included rights of due process, and provided in
relevant part that "no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
commit crimes abroad. Instead, he argued that aliens are not entitled to identical
opportunities under the Constitution. Id. at 2301.
328

140 U.S. 453 (1891).

329

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2256.

131

Id. at 2257.

331See infra notes 332-40 and accompanying text.
332 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
13'

234 U.S. 91 (1914).
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law[,]" and that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law." 334 In Dorr,the Supreme Court noted how the
executive had insisted on securing the new Philippine government the
protections of the Bill of Rights, but "was careful to reserve the right to trial
by jury.

'335

This was because the area of the island that had an existing rule

of law crafted their judiciary based on the civil law model.336 In the
Philippines, the accused was tried before a panel of judges, and additionally
had what the Court described as the:
[A]dded guaranty of the rights of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and
public trial, to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. And, further, that no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, nor
be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense, nor be compelled in any
337
criminal case to be a witness against himself

The Supreme Court, in Ocampo, affirmed Dorr's finding that "the
requirement of an indictment by grand jury is not included within the
' 33
guaranty of 'due process of law.' 8
Similarly, in Balzac v. Puerto Rico339 the Supreme Court held that jury
trials were not required in Puerto Rico. The Supreme Court reiterated the
proposition that:
[P]rovisions for jury trial in criminal and civil cases apply to the Territories of the
United States .... But it is just as clearly settled that they do not apply to territory
belonging to the United States which has not been incorporated into the Union... and
neither the Philippines nor Porto Rico was territory
which had been incorporated in
340
the Union or become a part of the United States.

These Insular cases are examples of U.S. participation in the
government of certain territories, albeit territories not incorporated as states,
where the civil law model of trial by judges-as is the case in the ICCfailed to offend Article III or the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution.

334 Philippine Bill of Rights (act of July 1, 1902 § 5, chap. 1369, 32 Stat. at L. 692),

available at http://www.thecorpusjuris.com/laws/constitutions/others/9-others/71-philippinebill-of- 1902.html.
331 195 U.S. at 145.
336 Id.

337 Id.
338 234 U.S. at 98.
339 258 U.S. 298, 304-14 (1922).
340

258 U.S. at 304-05.
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The case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez34' reconciled the
expansive dicta in Reid v. Covert with the Insular cases, affirming that the
latter are still good law. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, a criminal
defendant objected to Drug Enforcement Agency agents' warrantless search
of his Mexican residence. 342 The Ninth Circuit interpreted Reid v. Covert as
requiring that the government be bound by the Bill of Rights when it acts
abroad.343 The Ninth Circuit thus held that seized evidence was to be
suppressed for lack of a search warrant.344 The Supreme Court reversed.345
According to the Supreme Court, if only fundamental due process
rights apply to foreign occupied territories as established by the Insular
cases, then it is not possible for the Court "to endorse the view that every
constitutional provision applies wherever the United States Government
exercises its power., 346 This decision does not deny the possible
requirement for jury trials and other constitutional due process rights, but
the Supreme Court has signaled a more flexible approach to the issue once
the trial is convened anywhere other than on U.S. territory.
347
The Verdugo-Urquidez court also cited Johnson v. Eisentrager,
where the Supreme Court had previously declined to extend the application
of the Fifth Amendment extra-territorially:
Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so significant an
innovation in the practice of governments that, if intended or apprehended, it could
scarcely have failed to excite contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited. No
decision of the Court supports such a view. None of the learned commentators on our
has8 even hinted at it. The practice of every modem government is
Constitution 34
opposed to it.

People living in unincorporated territories governed by the United
States have no constitutional right to trial by jury.349 Clearly, criminal
defendants of the ICC need not be afforded this right. If the U.S.
government is neither always nor completely bound by the Bill of Rights
when it acts in a foreign land, then the actions of a non-U.S. court, the ICC,
on foreign soil at The Hague should not be held to an artificial standard of
compliance with the Bill of Rights. U.S. citizen defendants before the ICC
cannot somehow claim the right to transform it into a U.S. court complete
341 494 U.S. 259, 263, 267-70 (1990).
342

Id. at 262-64.

343United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1988).

344Id. at 1223.
34'494 U.S. at 275.
346 Id. at 268-69.
34'339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950).
348

856 F.2d at 269 (citing Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 784).

349See supra text accompanying notes 292-321.
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with all U.S. constitutional guarantees arising for criminal trials in the
United States, any more than a Canadian defendant can claim the right to
duplicate a Canadian trial when being prosecuted before the ICC.
By the terms of the Constitution itself,350 U.S. service personnel are
not entitled to a jury trial and they are excluded from the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of grand jury presentment.
Congress is
empowered, through Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution, "to
make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces." This power authorizes military trials of armed forces members
that do not necessarily include jury trials and all of the other rights provided
by the Bill of Rights. 351 Thus a situation where U.S. service personnel are
charged with committing, outside of the United States, atrocity crimes that
fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC should raise the fewest constitutional
concern if any one of them ultimately, following an unlikely American
waiver or gross abuse of complementarity rights, faces trial before the ICC.
VII. ARE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE ROME STATUTE?

Concern over the lack of a jury trial before the ICC joins other
prominent criticism of the Rome Statute, centering on the argument that
some of the most fundamental due process rights protected by the
Constitution are absent from the ICC. 352 If that criticism were accurate,

then U.S. participation in the ICC through ratification of the Rome Statute
would not necessarily fail the constitutional test of a legitimate use of the
Article II treaty power, but it would raise a politically untenable issue that
no administration would want to confront. Notwithstanding the political
challenge, an examination of the due process rights demonstrates that with
the exception of the right to trial by jury, discussed above, the ICC would
350 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.14.
351See Exparte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 21 (1879); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (1 How.) 65, 78
(1857); cf Neely v. Henkin, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901) (stating, in upholding a U.S.
service member's extradition to a country with fewer due process rights than provided by the
United States, "[U.S.] citizenship does not give [the service members] an immunity to
commit crime in other countries, nor entitle [them] to demand, of right, a trial in any other
mode than that allowed to its own people by the country whose laws [they have]
violated ...").
352 See, e.g., Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 840, 861 (2002) (warning against the U.S. participation in the
International Criminal Court because not all guarantees provided by the Bill of Rights would
be afforded); Andrew J. Walker, When a Good Idea is Poorly Implemented: How the
InternationalCriminal Court Fails to Be Insulatedfrom InternationalPolitics and Protect
Basic Due Process Guarantees, 106 W. VA. L. REv. 245, 259-72 (2004) (arguing that the
International Criminal Court's due process standards are insufficient because the statute
implementing them is ambiguous, omits important protections, and is vulnerable to political
manipulation).
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provide a U.S. defendant with essentially the same due process rights as
enjoyed in U.S. courts. That does not mean the particular due process right
enforced by the ICC would be identical to how it might be exercised and
protected in federal courts. However, to pass the U.S. constitutional test for
an international criminal court, one would expect that the due process right
in its broad character is protected by the Rome Statute and associated Rules
of Procedure and Evidence.
Scholars and commentators have long recognized that fundamental
due process rights are protected by the Rome Statute.353 The late Monroe
353Wedgwood, supra note 3, at 119, 121, 123:
Second, the ICC is carefully structured with procedural protections that closely follow the
guarantees and safeguards of the American Bill of Rights and other liberal constitutional
systems. Third, the offenses within the ICC's jurisdiction would otherwise ordinarily be handled
through military courts-martial or through extradition of offenders to the foreign nation where an
offense occurred. Thus, the detailed structure of American common law trial procedure would
not ordinarily be applicable to these cases in any event .... American negotiators at Rome
worked hard to ensure that the permanent ICC would follow demanding standards of due
process. To that end, any defendant is guaranteed the right to have timely notice of the charges
against him, the presumption of innocence, the right against self-incrimination, also forbidding
any adverse inference from the exercise of the right to silence, the right to the assistance of
counsel and to the assistance of an interpreter, the right to bail, the right to a speedy trial, the
right to conduct a defense in person or through the defendant's chosen counsel, the right to crossexamine the witnesses against him and to call witnesses on his own behalf, the right to disclosure
of any exculpatory evidence, the right not to bear any burden of proof but rather to require the
prosecution to prove guilt "beyond reasonable doubt," and the right not to be subjected to any
form of duress or coercion, or any cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. In addition, the
ICC Statute even guarantees a form of Miranda warnings-a privilege that has often been
criticized in the United States since its enunciation by the Supreme Court in 1966 as offering
undue protection of criminal suspects. The Miranda case requires oral notice of rights when a
defendant is in custodial interrogation. The ICC statue is even more protective, requiring that the
prosecution advise a person of his rights before he is questioned whenever there are grounds to
believe that he has committed a crime, even in noncustodial interrogation-including a warning
of the right to remain silent, the right to legal assistance, the right to have counsel appointed if he
cannot afford it, and the right to be questioned in the presence of counsel.
The major differences from common law procedure in the ICC are the use of a factfinding
panel of three Judges instead of a jury, with a verdict to be rendered by the vote of at least two
Judges, and the availability of an appeal by the prosecution from errors of fact, law, and

procedure.
See also Patricia M. Wald, InternationalCriminal Courts-A Stormy Adolescence, 46 VA. J.
INT'L L. 319, 345 (2006) ("Opposition is sometimes voiced in the United States that the

procedures of the ICC do not provide the fundamental guarantees that our country holds
indispensable for its own trials. Yet all of the international tribunals so far, and certainly the
ICC, have adopted the main principles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, to which the United States is a signatory ....Having sat on two year-long trials at
the Hague under such rules, I can attest that I did not feel at any time that the defendants
were not receiving a basically fair trial. Our refusal to try and work out resolutions of our
problems with the ICC may turn out to be the lesson not learned from our prior leadership
role in the international court movement."); Patricia M. Wald, Why I Support the
InternationalCriminal Court, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 513, 521 (2003) ("[T]he court operates by
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Leigh, who served as the State Department Legal Adviser during the
Republican Ford Administration and who was a leading member of the
District of Columbia Bar, testified on behalf of the American Bar
Association before Congress in 2000. 354 In his testimony he supported the
position that due process rights of the U.S. Constitution are found in
substantial measure in the Rome Statute.3 55 The Leigh testimony is worth
amplifying in this article, and we do so liberally, as observers may have
forgotten how clearly Monroe Leigh articulated the obvious strengths of the
Rome Statute with respect to due process rights.
Set forth below are due process rights found in and protected by the
U.S. Constitution and, with the exception of the right to jury trial,
essentially replicated in the Rome Statute. Any federal court examining the
constitutionality of a U.S. national being prosecuted before the ICC would
have to take notice of the substantial degree of similarity of these rights as
they are protected in both U.S. law and in the Rome Statute.
Aside from the right to jury trial, there is no fundamental due process
right protected by the U.S. Constitution that is not also found in significant
form in the Rome Statute. In a manner similar to that employed by Monroe
Leigh in his 2000 Congressional testimony, we set forth below a summary
list of those fundamental constitutional rights and their antecedents in the
Rome Statute. We draw guidance from Leigh's testimony as we believe it
merits re-emphasis eight years later, particularly as it is an expression of the
views of the American Bar Association on the Rome Statute. Its clarity
diminishes constitutional concerns about the Statute.
Certainly one can quibble about lack of precise parity on some issues,
but given the highly sophisticated procedural and substantive structure of
the ICC and its minute attention to due process rights both in its own
constitutional documents and in the work to date of the Pre-Trial Chamber

rules [that] contain the same or stronger guarantees of fair trial than the ad hoc tribunals
which we fully support and where we are quite happy to have the nationals of other countries

tried. Ironically, the United States government is currently attempting to deny the most basic
of these rights-the right to counsel-to anyone the executive designates as an 'enemy
combatant,' even American citizen apprehended in the United States. The statutory
guarantees and rules governing ICC procedures include the equivalent of a probable cause
hearing, liberal pretrial discovery, a public trial in the presence of the accused, right to
counsel and to confront one's accusers, privilege against self-incrimination, rights to notice
of the charges and to an interpreter in preparing the defense, right to provisional release
pending trial, bars against non-probative and unreliable evidence or evidence secured in
violation of human rights, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and a right to appeal.").
354 The InternationalCriminal Court: HearingsBefore the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations,

106th Cong. 92-101 (2000) (statement of Monroe Leigh on behalf of the American Bar
Association) [hereinafter Leigh Statement]; Wedgwood, supra note 3, at 121, 123.
355 Leigh Statement, supra note 354; Wedgwood, supra note 3, at 121, 123.
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of the ICC, 356 disparities between U.S. law and the law and practice of the

ICC do not give rise to any serious doubt about the fundamental protection
of the defendant's due process rights before the ICC.
Right of confrontation of accusers and cross-examinationof witnesses.
This Sixth Amendment right 357 is addressed in Article 67(1)(e) of the Rome

Statute, which entitles the accused, "To examine, or have examined, the
witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination
of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him or her."
The right to remain silent and the guarantee against compulsory selfincrimination. This Fifth Amendment 358 right is addressed in Article
67(l)(g) of the Rome Statute, which entitles the accused, "Not to be
compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent, without such
silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence."
Article 54(1)(a) requires the Prosecutor "to investigate incriminating and
exonerating circumstances equally ....

356

The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber have addressed numerous pre-trial

issues in more than 38 decisions through July 2008. They have included a wide range of
issues concerning pre-trial disclosure of evidence, including exculpatory evidence, the role
of the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber in the investigation of a case, interim release
provisions, confirmation hearings, jurisdiction and admissibility, procedures for the
unsealing and execution of arrest warrants, preparation of witness statements, victims'
participation, and language translations.
All of the decisions can be accessed at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html. Many of the Pre-Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber
decisions are described in SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 254-82. With respect to the role of the
Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber in investigative matters, see Scheffer, A Review of the
Experiences of the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers of the International Criminal Court
Regarding the Disclosure of Evidence, supra note 7. With respect to the execution of arrest
warrants, see David Scheffer, InternationalCriminal Court: Introductory Note to Decision
on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute in the Case of the
Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (Amad Harun) and Ali Muhammad Al Abd-AlRahman (Ali Kushayb) ICC Pre-TrialChamberI, in 46 I.L.M. 532 (2007).
357 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public
trial ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See
SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 295-99; STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 305-26 (2005); ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 50, at 314-15 (2008);
SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 129-40

(2003).
358 "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
359Note that the ICTY and ICTY's statutes, while not identical, have many similarities to
the Rome Statute of the ICC. The ICTY has held that under its Statute, defendants have the
right to remain silent and the right against self-incrimination. E.g. Prosecutor v. Limaj et al.,
Case No. IT-03-66-T (Nov. 30, 2005); Momir Nikolic, Case No. IT-02-60/1-T (Dec. 2,
2003). See SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 298:
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The presumption of innocence. This constitutional right, confirmed in
Coffin v. United States,360 is found in Article 66(1) of the Rome Statute,
which reads in part, "Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty before the Court in accordance with the applicable law., 361 The other
sub-paragraphs of Article 66 place the onus for proving the guilt of the
accused on the Prosecutor and require that in order to convict the accused,
"the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt."
362
The right to a speedy and public trial. This Sixth Amendment right
is found in Articles 67(1) and 67(1)(c) of the Rome Statute. Article 67(1)
provides that "the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing. . . ." Article
67(1(c) states that the accused shall be entitled "To be tried without undue
delay."
The right to assistance of counsel. This Sixth Amendment 363 right is
provided for in Articles 67(l)(b) and (d) of the Rome Statute. Article
67(l)(b) provides that that accused shall be entitled "to communicate freely
with counsel of accused's choosing in confidence .... ." Article 67(l)(d)
requires that the accused shall be entitled "to have legal assistance assigned
There is one witness who can never be compelled to testify, however: the
defendant .... [T]he silence of an accused cannot be a consideration in the determination of
guilt or innocence. The text clarifies the fact that an accused may refuse to testify altogether, and
not merely to testify when the evidence is "against himself." The provision reflects concerns
with encroachments upon the right to silence in some national justice systems. Specifically,
English common law has always prevented any adverse inference being drawn from an
accused's failure to testify.
See also TRECHSEL, supra note 357, at 341-59; ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 50, at 303-07

("Whereas the US Constitution's Fifth Amendment is restricted to oral testimony,
international human rights jurisprudence has adopted a more expansive approach, extending
the privilege against self-incrimination to such materials as the defendant produces
willingly." Id. at 305.); ZAPPALA supra note 357, at 77-79 ("The various aspects of this right
[to remain silent] have been thoroughly recognized in the ICC Statute." Id. at 78).
360 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).

361 The ICTY, which operates under a similar statute as the ICC, has held that "the

accused enjoys the benefit of the presumption of innocence." Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case
No. IT-95-14/2-A,
833 (Dec. 17, 2004). See SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 203-05;
TRECHSEL, supra note 357, at 153-91; ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 50, at 302-03;
ZAPPALA, supra note 357, at 85-100 ("[I]n respect of the presumption of innocence, the rules
of the ICC Statute are to be considered as a model." Id. at 94).
362 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public
trial ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 209-10; TRECHSEL,
supra note 357, at 136, 141, 147; ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 50, at 300-02; ZAPPALA,
supra note 357, at 114-19.
363 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy.., the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 290-92; TRECHSEL,
supra note 357, at 242-90; ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 50, at 309-14; ZAPPALA, supra
note 357, at 59-66.

1052

DAVID SCHEFFER& ASHLEY COX

[Vol. 98

by the Court where the interests of justice so require, and without payment
if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for it ......
The right to a written statement of charges. This Sixth Amendment
right 364 is provided for in Article 61(3) of the Rome Statute, which states
that within a reasonable time before the Pre-Trial Chamber holds a hearing
to confirm the charges, the person charged must "[b]e provided with a copy
of the document containing the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to
bring the person to trial ....
,,365
The right to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses. This Sixth
Amendment right 366 is addressed by Article 67(1)(e) of the Rome Statute,
which states that the accused shall be entitled "to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him or her."
The prohibition against ex post facto crimes. The Constitution
367
requires, "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.,
Similarly, Article 22(1) of the Rome Statute provides, "A person shall not
be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court."
The protection againstdouble jeopardy. The Fifth Amendment states
that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be put in jeopardy
of life or limb." Article 20(3) (Ne bis in idem) of the Rome Statute states in
relevant part that "No person who has been tried by another court for
conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court
with respect to the same conduct. ..." There are two exceptions to this
rule, however, which one might argue present a problem. These are if the
proceedings before the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) [o]therwise were
not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due

364"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
365 The ICTY statute shares a similar due process right and the ICTY has upheld it. See
e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A (Feb. 28, 2005).
366 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy.., to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See International Criminal
Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 65(1) ("A witness who appears before the Court is
compellable by the Court to provide testimony ....
");CASSESE, supra note 37, at 12991300; SCHABAS, supranote 17, at 298; ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 357, at 315.
367U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 9, cl. 3; see BASSIOUNI,supra note 76, at 747-49 (5th
ed. 2007);
CASSESE, supra note 37, at 746-56.
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process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the
circumstances,
was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
36 8
justice.

These exceptions have to exist for the ICC to have any viability.
Otherwise, nations could conduct a sham trial leading to impunity for an
alleged perpetrator for the sole purpose of evading ICC jurisdiction with no
recourse by the ICC. If, because of a prior acquittal or other disposition of
a case in a U.S. judicial proceeding, it was determined that the United
States in fact was "unwilling or unable genuinely" to prosecute the case,
there would be such a serious breakdown in the U.S. proceedings that the
double jeopardy rule would be severely qualified in any event.
It is worth noting that although double jeopardy is a fundamental
constitutional protection,369 where an acquittal is the product of corruption
or a final judgment is the result of a sham trial, a defendant may be reprosecuted.3 7 ° In People v. Aleman, the defendant moved to dismiss murder
charges brought against him due to double jeopardy, where he had bribed
the judge to obtain a prior acquittal.371 Under the theory that jeopardy,
means risk, the court held that re-prosecution was proper because the
defendant was never at risk during his first case where the outcome was
pre-ordained.3 72 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts held that a so-called trial was nothing more than a
sham.3 73 During the "trial" the judge coached the defense to bring forth one
witness (defendant's daughter who knew no facts relevant to the alleged
charges) with the sole intention of attaching double jeopardy. 374 The court
reasoned that because this witness's testimony "had no bearing on the
defendant's guilt or innocence," double jeopardy had not attached and the
defendant could be re-prosecuted.3 75 These principles of law qualifying the
prohibition against double jeopardy are similar to the sham trial concept
found in the Rome Statute's approach to the issue.
368 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 20(3)(a)-(b). See BASSIOUNI, supra note 76, at 74968; CASSESE, supra note 37, at 704-29; SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 191-93; ZAHAR &
SLUITER, supra note 50, at 317-18; ZAPPALA, supra note 357, at 175-77, 194.
369 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 76, at 749-69.
370 Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy and Judicial Accountability: When is an
Acquittal Not An Acquittal?, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953 (1995) (analyzing how judicial
misconduct and corruption may be cited to either prevent jeopardy from attaching or to
characterize an acquittal as something else, with the end result being re-prosecution).
371 People v. Aleman, Nos. 93 CR 28786, 93 CR 28787, 1994 WL 684499 (I11.Cir.
1994).
372 Id. at *6-15 & *20-21.
373 771 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. 2002).
374 Id. at 138, 282.
375 Id. at 282.
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Freedom from warrantless arrests and searches. This Fourth
Amendment right376 is protected in Articles 57(3)(a) and 58 of the Rome
Statute. Article 57(3)(a) establishes that the Pre-Trial Chamber may "at the
request of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants as may be required
for the purposes of an investigation . . . ." Article 58 stipulates that the PreTrial shall issue a warrant of arrest of a person upon application of the
Prosecutor and "if, having examined the application and the evidence or
other information submitted by the Prosecutor, it is satisfied that (a) There
are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court; and (b) The arrest of the person appears
necessary ....
The right to be present at the trial. This constitutional right,
confirmed in Illinois v. Allen, 377 is protected in Article 63 of the Rome
Statute, which requires that, "The Accused shall be present during the trial."
The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. This judicially-created
prohibition, confirmed in Illinois v. Krull,378 is reflected in Article 69(7) of
-the Rome Statute, which states:
Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or internationally
recognized human rights shall not be admissible if: (a) The violation casts substantial
doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or (b) The admission of the evidence would
be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.

The prohibition against trials in absentia. This judicially-created
prohibition, confirmed in Diaz v. United States,379 is found in Article 63(1)
of the Rome Statute, which requires that, "The accused shall be present
during the trial." Similar to U.S. practice, Article 63(2) of the Rome Statute
provides:
If the accused, being present before the Court, continues to disrupt the trial, the
Trial Chamber may remove the accused and shall make provision for him or her to
observe the trial and instruct counsel from outside the courtroom, through the use of
communications technology, if required. Such measures shall be taken only in
exceptional circumstances after other reasonable alternatives have proved inadequate,
and only for such duration as is strictly required.

376 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
177 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370
(1892)).
17' 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
379223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912). See CASSESE, supra note 37, at 1292; SCHABAS, supra note
17, at 299; ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 50, at 380-82; ZAPPALA, supra note 357, at 149-52.
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The right to a "Miranda" warning.3" ° Article 55(2) of the Rome
Statute, set forth below, requires even more extensive protection than does
American practice embodied in the "Miranda" warning, and the ICC must
ensure such protection at an earlier stage in the proceedings:
Where there are grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court and that person is about to be questioned either by the
Prosecutor, or by national authorities pursuant to a request made under Part 9, that
person shall also have the following rights of which he or she shall be informed prior
to being questioned:
(a) To be informed, prior to being questioned, that there are grounds to believe that he
or she has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(b) To remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination
of guilt or innocence;
(c) To have legal assistance of the person's choosing, or, if the person does not have
legal assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the
interests of justice so require, and without payment by the person in any such case if
the person does not have sufficient means to pay for it; and
of counsel unless the person has voluntarily
(d) To be questioned in the presence
381
waived his or her right to counsel.

The jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR and the ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber has shown both over the years and in recent times that
fundamental due process rights, historically drawn in part from the Bill of
Rights, are consistently protected by these international criminal tribunals.
One can always concoct extreme and highly unlikely, if not implausible,
hypotheticals to demonstrate the possibility of a due process right being
denied to the defendant, particularly if the ICC were to malfunction as a
court governed by its own constitutional documents. But the United States
exists in the real world and the ICC is not only real, it serves up due process
rights on a golden platter to the defendants appearing before it. Taking
"yes" for an answer may not serve the interests of extremists, but it does
offer both pragmatists and idealists the opportunity to use U.S.
constitutional principles in the pursuit of international justice.
A Miranda warning is based on the Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, and
requires that a police officer recite the following in order to inform a person being arrested of
his or her constitutional rights: (1) you have the right to remain silent, and need not answer
any questions, (2) if you do answer questions, anything you say can be used against you, (3)
you have the right to consult with a lawyer before and during questioning by the police, and
(4) if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided to you. 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966);
see CASSESE, supra note 37, at 389-94; SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 287-90; ZAPPALA, supra
note 357, at 125-29.
381 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 55(2).
380
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VIII. OFFICIAL IMMUNITY DEFENSES

Perhaps the most historic provision of the Rome Statute, the rule that
revolutionized centuries of state practice, is Article 27, which for State
Parties removes any immunity for officials "whether under national or
international law.,
383

crimes

382

Since the ICC essentially focuses on leadership
it would be incompatible with the purpose of the Court to permit

the highest leaders of a government, engaged in the planning and execution
of atrocity crimes, to avoid prosecution while subordinates were held

accountable. This fundamental necessity in the prosecution of atrocity
crimes was recognized and codified in the Nuremberg 384 and Tokyo
Tribunals,

385

the Genocide Convention, 386 and in International Criminal

Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia387 and Rwanda,388 the Special Court for
Sierra Leone,38 9 and other modern-day war crimes tribunals.39 °

It is not

surprising that in the negotiations leading to the Rome Statute both the
rationale and practical need to hold leaders accountable before the ICC
provided the evidence points to their direct or superior responsibility for the
39
commission of the atrocity crimes under investigation became clear. '
Hence, Article 27 is firmly rooted in the document.39 2

382 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 27;

SCHABAS,

supra note 17, at 253-54.

These rights [to remain silent, receive legal assistance, and be questioned only in the presence
of counsel] go well beyond the requirements of international human rights norms set out in such
instruments as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and as a general rule
surpass the rights recognized in even the most advanced and progressive justice systems. But the
Statute insists that these norms be honoured, even if the questioning is being carried out by
officials of national justice systems pursuant to a request from the Court.
Id. at 253; ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 50, at 305 ("Interestingly, wide-ranging protection
during interrogation has rather uncritically been included in the ICC Statute. Article 55 of
this statute elevates the 'Miranda' rights to a fundamental rule of ICC procedure.").
383 SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 171-86.
384 Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
385 Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 at 3, 4 Bevans 20.
386 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
387 ICTY Statute, supra note 9.
388 ICTR Statute, supra note 10.
389 The Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
390 These include: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2008); U.N. Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo, http://www.unmikonline.org/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2008);
The Iraqi Special Tribunal, http://www.iraq-iht.org/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
391 SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 210-23.
392 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra
note 74, at 202;

THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT:

A
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Some State Parties have had to amend their constitutions, which
include express immunity provisions for their highest officials, so as to lift
such immunities for the commission of atrocity crimes and thus enable the
ICC to reach, for example, the President of France if he or she were to be
implicated in such crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 39 3 In
contrast, the U.S. Constitution does not include any express grant of official
immunity. If the United States were to enter into an international treaty,
such as the Rome Statute, that prohibits head of state or other high-level
immunity from prosecution before an international court for the
commission of atrocity crimes, such an act would not, on its face, be barred
by the terms of the U.S. Constitution.
Defining the scope of presidential immunities, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Constitution to grant immunity to officials while in office,
but not for criminal matters; absolute immunity is only granted for civil
damages.394 The test case has not arisen which would confirm or deny the
immunity of the President from criminal prosecution.
The remedy
explicitly offered by the Constitution is impeachment proceedings, but the
question arises whether that is the sole remedy for crimes committed by a
sitting President or whether prosecution is an alternative to impeachment in
the event of criminal conduct. The further option, explicitly authorized by
the Constitution, would be criminal prosecution following a successful
impeachment proceeding which convicts and thus removes the individual
from the presidency. We do not seek to settle these constitutional
arguments here as they remain problematic and untested in U.S. courts. But
it should be recognized that the United States has the benefit, if one views it
that way, of not being burdened with express constitutional immunities for
high officials which would necessitate constitutional amendment if the
United States were to ratify the Rome Statute.
supra note 74, at 975-1000 (offering a detailed examination of official
capacity and immunities under international law and Article 27 of the Rome Statute).
393 Decision No. 98-408 DC, 1999 J.O. (20) 1317; see also para. 14 of the Preamble of
the Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Oct. 27, 1946 (Constitution de 1946, prrambule
(Fr.) (reaffirmed in the Constitution du 4 Octobre 1958, prrambule)); see generally Helen
Duffy, National Constitutional Compatibility and the International Criminal Court, 11
DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5 (2001) (discussing the need for certain countries to amend their
constitutions in order to ratify the Rome Statute and arguments relevant to ratifying it
without constitutional amendment).
394 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (finding that executive privilege does not
protect information subpoenaed pursuant to a criminal investigation); Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731 (1982) (finding that the President has absolute immunity from civil cases based
on actions taken in official presidential capacity). Cf Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)
(finding that the President was not to be afforded temporary immunity from a civil lawsuit
because the actions alleged were not related to his duties as President, but rather occurred
before he took office).
COMMENTARY,

1058

DAVID SCHEFFER& ASHLEY COX

[Vol. 98

Nonetheless, the United States almost certainly would attach a
declaration to its ratification of the Rome Statute that would recite the
Constitutional procedures for impeachment proceedings and their
availability to the U.S. Congress in the event the President or VicePresident were indicted by the ICC and the United States exercised its
complementarity privilege. If the ICC were to indict the President or
another high U.S. official, and the United States were a State Party to the
Rome Statute, complementarity would be the first line of defense on the
part of U.S. officials. One would expect an investigation by the Justice
Department or Congress which may result in clearing the President or other
high official of any criminal conduct that might fall within ICC jurisdiction.
Whether that would satisfy the ICC under the standards set forth in Articles
17 and 18 of the Rome Statute cannot be foretold. But there should be
some good faith effort to examine the ICC charges and whether U.S. law,
potentially amended to accommodate the atrocity crimes of the ICC's
jurisdiction, has been violated. This would be a practical pathway through
the immunity maze for the United States if it were to become a State Party
to the Rome Statute.
If, for example, Congress were to amend Titles 10 and 18 of the U.S.
Code, as suggested above, there could be an additional amendment
explicitly denying the highest officials any immunity defense for
commission of atrocity crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC. In
other words, any presumed immunity defense would be stripped from
federal law with respect to one narrow band of the worst possible crimes:
genocide, crimes against humanity, serious war crimes, and aggression if
the latter is activated for the ICC. That should satisfy implementation of
Article 27 of the Rome Statute in the context of a U.S. ratification of the
Rome Statute, particularly since there is no explicit constitutional clause
requiring amendment as was the case in France.
The counter-argument could be made that the President and other top
officials require immunity from criminal investigations for atrocity crimes
in order to conduct foreign policy and military policy without fear of
prosecution.395 But that conventional argument belies the huge leap
forward in international criminal law during the last fifteen years in which
such heinous crimes cannot be tolerated, particularly as acts of political and
military leaders who can use the powers of the State to bring death and
destruction to large civilian populations. If the United States were to
invoke an exceptionalist argument, contending that Washington must stand
395 See Bolton, supra note 3, at 170 ("Who will advise a President that he
is
unequivocally safe from the retroactive imposition of criminal liability if he guesses
wrong?"); Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the InternationalCriminal Court, 25 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 840, 848-50 (2002).
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apart from other nations and shield its own leaders from scrutiny with
respect to atrocity crimes, then there would be strong grounds, in defiance
of American exceptionalism, for arguing that every other State Party to the
Rome Statute should endow its own leaders with identical immunity from
prosecution. Such a dismantling of Article 27 of the Rome Statute would
decimate the entire purpose and operation of the ICC.
IX. PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

There are a number of measures and initiatives that the United States
could undertake to overcome any lingering concerns about the
constitutionality of the Rome Statute, and most pertain to the ratification
process:
1) As briefly noted already,396 the Executive Branch should consider
submitting the Rome Statute to the U.S. Congress for approval as a
congressional-executive agreement requiring majority votes in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate.397 This procedure would comport
with the Article I, Section 8 power of Congress "to define and
punish... Offenses against the Law of Nations" and confirm Congressional
consent to prosecution before the ICC of all of the crimes constituting the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Rome Statute. As additional security
against constitutional challenge, the Executive Branch could seek a twothirds vote by the Senate to satisfy the Article II, Section 2 requirement for
the Advice and Consent of the Senate for the making of treaties. This
would require masterful political preparation by the President and
Congressional leaders from both the majority and minority parties in order
to achieve such a two-pronged and novel result.
2) A variation on this approach would be a conventional Senate advice
and consent to ratification preceded by implementing legislation (a
necessity in any event) adopted by Congress and that addresses a range of
critical issues: incorporation of atrocity crimes into the federal and military
criminal codes, procedures for U.S. cooperation with the ICC pursuant to
the Rome Statute, and waiver of official immunity regarding crimes falling
under ICC jurisdiction. The implementing legislation could mandate U.S.
396 See Part V, supra.

397 As an "inactive" signatory to the Rome Statute following the delivery of the Bolton
letter of May 6, 2002, to the United Nations (see note 27, supra), we propose that the
President deliver a second letter to the United Nations, as depository to the Rome Statute,
essentially revoking the May 6, 2002 letter and confirming the resumption of U.S. legal
obligations as a signatory State to the Rome Statute (namely, not to defeat the object and
purpose of the Rome Statute). This step would enable the President to proceed most
efficiently with ratification (rather than accession) procedures for adoption of the Rome
Statute.
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exercise of the complementarity principle in the event of an ICC
investigation that might target US. nationals and thus afford such nationals
full constitutional protection in U.S. courts if they merit prosecution, with
the result of avoiding ICC jurisdiction altogether.
This fusion of two constitutional powers-the treaty power as
manifested in two well-established procedures for the making of treaties
and the define and punish power as manifested in Congressional approval
of the defined atrocity crimes and the courts (domestic and international)
before which they could be punished-should demonstrate a constitutional
foundation for the Rome Statute.
3) Although the Rome Statute prohibits reservations, the United States
would be entitled to attach declarations, understandings, and provisos to the
document as part of the ratification process. Many other governments that
are State Parties to the ICC have used this procedure to protect vital
interests. 39 For example, Australia imposed extremely rigorous conditions
for the surrender of a person to the ICC and it required that ICC crimes
"will be interpreted and applied in a way that accords with the way they are
implemented in Australian domestic law. ' ' 399 France interpreted Article 8 of
the Rome Statute to relate solely to conventional weapons and not to
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons or "impair the other rules of
international law applicable to other weapons necessary to the exercise by
France of its inherent right of self-defense .,4 0
a) The United States could attach an understanding to its instrument of
ratification stipulating that procedures similar to extradition procedures
would be applied with respect to surrender requests from the ICC, but that
the Secretary of State would have to meet further rigorous criteria in
making the final determination on surrender of a U.S. citizen to the ICC
pursuant to treaty obligations under the Rome Statute. Those criteria could
include receipt by the Secretary of State of a recommendation by a
distinguished group of outside legal experts, including retired military
lawyers, that the United States had failed to meet the complementarity test
of the treaty for exclusive and permanent domestic jurisdiction in the
particular case, and that therefore compliance with the ICC's surrender
request was justifiable under the circumstances. This effectively would be
398

SCHABAS, supra note 17, at 328-29; International Criminal Court, Assembly of States

Parties, http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html.
399 The International Criminal Court Act 2002 and the International Criminal Court
(Consequential Amendments) Act 2002, June 28, 2002. See Gidean Boas, An Overview of
Implementation by Australia of the Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 179 (2004).
400 Declarations Made by France Upon Ratifying the Statute of the International Criminal

Court, June 9, 2000, availableat http://www.lcnp.org/global/french.htm#attachment.
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second-guessing the ICC judges requesting the surrender of the U.S.
indictee, but the Secretary of State would weigh that factor in reaching a
final decision on the fate of the indictee. Indeed, it would be surprising if
any State Party would blindly accept the view of the ICC judges as to a
failure of complementarity without some kind of internal review prior to a
surrender of a national indictee to the ICC. The Secretary of State also
would be required to determine whether the surrender of the individual to
the ICC would so impair national security or the foreign policy of the
country that American withdrawal from the Rome Statute should be
initiated by the President while the indictee remains in the United States.
This is a procedure that, if used, probably would put the United States in
violation of the Rome Statute.
b) The United States could attach a proviso of the type used previously
in treaty ratification 40 1 stating "the U.S. intention that nothing in the Rome
Statute requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United
States that is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the
United States." We have shown in this article that appropriate use of the
treaty and define and punish powers of the U.S. Constitution should resolve
the constitutional concerns and thus not lead to any requirement under the
Rome Statute for legislation or "other action" prohibited by the
Constitution. This is quite apart from considerations about the sufficiency
of due process protections under the Rome Statute. The extreme view
would counsel not surrendering a U.S. national to the ICC for prosecution if
it is determined that he or she would be deprived of a constitutional right
that the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence protect but
which, under the actual circumstances of the case, in fact are not being
protected.
c) The United States could attach a declaration explaining that any
U.S. national subject to an arrest warrant approved by the ICC, particularly
for an atrocity crime committed in the United States, would be investigated
and, if merited, prosecuted before a U.S. court by jury trial or court martial.
The U.S. declaration would further stipulate that if the alleged U.S. citizen
perpetrator is outside the United States, the U.S. government will undertake
every legal effort to secure custody of such individual so that the United
States can exercise its complementarity right over that individual and bring
such person to justice before U.S. courts. Finally, the declaration could
recite the constitutional procedures for impeachment proceedings and note
their availability to the U.S. Congress in the event the President or other

401

See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999

U.N.T.S. 171, 6 ILM 368 (1967).
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42
high government officials are suspected of committing atrocity crimes,
and that such impeachment procedures would be regarded by the United
States as part of the complementarity procedures under the Rome Statute,
recognizing that criminal proceedings may still be required before U.S.
courts regarding any such official.
d) Another declaration could confirm that the ICC's jurisdictional
reach over the United States and its nationals commences on the first day of
the month after the 60th day following U.S. ratification, which would
accord with the strict terms of the temporal jurisdiction of the Rome
Statute. 40 3 The ICC Prosecutor focuses on the most serious atrocities and
the Security Council has begun to flex its power to refer atrocity situations
pertaining to non-party States and their nationals to the ICC. 4 04 But with
such a declaration the U.S. Senate (or Congress) would serve notice that the
ICC must not seek to investigate U.S. citizens for events occurring prior to
U.S. participation in the ICC as a State Party. Such a declaration would
confirm the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto crimes. In the
long run, other State Parties should accept such an explicit interpretation as
a reasonable price to pay for U.S. participation, and one that is implicitly
endorsed by existing State Parties anyway. °5 No government that has

402

Such acts should constitute "High Crimes" meriting impeachment under the

Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 4.
403 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 11(1); David Scheffer, How to Turn the Tide Using

the Rome Statute's Temporal Jurisdiction, 2 INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 26, 29 (2004) (a proper
interpretation of Articles 11(2), 12(3), 22(1), 24, 121(5), and 126(2), taken together,

establishes that the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC over any particular individual is
determined in accordance with the date upon which the Rome Statute enters into force for
such individual's State of nationality and whether certain circumstances, such as a U.N.
Security Council referral of the relevant situation to the ICC or the special consent by the
State of nationality of the individual, have occurred prior to the entry into force of the Rome
Statute for that State).
404 For example, for information regarding the ICC's treatment of the situation in Darfur,
Sudan, see International Criminal Court: Darfur, Sudan, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases
/Darfur.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2008).
405 Bearing in mind the start date for jurisdiction of the Rome Statute for any newly ratified
State Party under Article 126(2), the only way Article 24 makes sense is if it means, "No person
shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to entry into force of this
Statute for the State of nationality of such person." Article 24 is a general principle of criminal
law in the Rome Statute and pertains to the non-retroactivity ratione personae; its whole purpose
is to deal with the "person" with respect to criminal responsibility. When read in conjunction
with Article 11(2), Article 24 must refer to entry into force for that person's state of
Indeed, if a poll were to be taken today of all States Parties that ratified the
nationality ....
Rome Statute after I July 2002, how many of those governments would confirm their
understanding that their nationals have been fully subject to ICC jurisdiction since 1 July 2002
[and prior to that nation's ratification of the Rome Statute], pursuant to Article 24? I submit that
not a single one, if it considered the matter seriously, would do so.
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ratified the Rome Statute has publicly declared that it accepts the ICC's
jurisdiction over itself or its nationals for events occurring prior to such
nation joining the Court, absent its consent. Therefore, this should not be a
controversial declaration for the United States to make, or to enforce
domestically and in its relations with other State Parties and with the Court.
e) A declaration to the Rome Statute could stipulate an intention on the
part of the United States to withdraw from the treaty, in accordance with
Article 127 of the Rome Statute, if any one of four situations occur: First, if
any U.S. citizen convicted by the ICC is imprisoned in any country other
than the United States without U.S. consent.40 6 Second, if the Rome Statute
is amended despite U.S. opposition to permit the death penalty in its
sentencing procedures. 40 7 Third, if the President determines that the
fundamental due process rights of the Rome Statute are being
systematically and irreversibly denied by the judges of the ICC in their
decisions and judgments. Fourth, if the President determines that the ICC
judges and/or the ICC Prosecutor have become so politically biased or
corrupted in the performance of their duties that the United States has lost
confidence in the independence, objectivity, and credibility of the ICC as a
judicial body and has further determined that such violations of the Rome
Statute cannot be remedied within a reasonable period of time.
f) A further declaration or understanding by the United States could
stipulate that the United States reserves the right to oppose any amendment
to the Rome Statute that seeks to add drug trafficking, terrorism, or other
crimes commonly prosecuted domestically or pursuant to specialized
multilateral treaty regimes which the United States has determined are
superior means of enforcing domestic and international law with respect to
those crimes. If any such amendment were to be adopted by the requisite
vote of the State Parties, the United States would consider exercising its
rights under Article 121 (5 & 6) of the Rome Statute.40 8 If the United States
Scheffer, How to Turn the Tide Using the Rome Statute's Temporal Jurisdiction,supra note

403.
406

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 103. The reality is that the United States would have

to enter into an agreement with the ICC to incarcerate convicted individuals. Perhaps as part
of the terms of such agreement, the U.S. could require that any U.S. citizen convicted by the
ICC must be incarcerated in the United States unless otherwise agreed with the United
States. We recommend that, if successfully negotiated, such a bilateral arrangement between
the United States and the ICC could be treated as a supplement to the implementing
legislation enabling the United States to join the ICC.
407 While the United States invokes the death penalty at the federal level, as do a number
of the nation's states, it probably would be politically impossible for the U.S. government to
agree to the ICC administering the death penalty to an American, and it is almost
inconceivable given the widespread opposition to the death penalty by a large number of the
State Parties.
408 Article 121(5) reads:
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were to join the ICC prior to an amendment to the Rome Statute that
activates the crime of aggression, then Washington could exercise its
Article 121(5) right as a State Party to opt out of any ICC liability for U.S.
citizens with respect to the crime of aggression.
4) If the United States were to become a State Party to the Rome
Statute prior to the convening of the Article 123 Review Conference, now
scheduled for 2010, it could participate as a voting member of that
conference and propose amendments to the Rome Statute and probably to
any of its supplemental agreements, particularly the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.40 9 In the realm of constitutional issues, the United States could
propose that there be a new rule in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, or
an amendment to Article 19, requiring a special mandatory admissibility
review in addition to the review required by Article 19(2) when there is a
challenge by any one of several parties.4 10 The second review would be
based on Article 19(1), which reads: "The Court shall satisfy itself that it
has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The Court may, on its own
motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17."

Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States
Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the
Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when
committed by that State party's nationals or on its territory.
Article 121(6) reads:
If an amendment has been accepted by seven-eights of States Parties in accordance with
paragraph 4, any State Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this
Statute with immediate effect, notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1,but subject to article
127, paragraph 2, by giving notice no later than one year after the entry intro force of such
amendment.
4" Article 123(1) reads:
Seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary-General of the United
Nations shall convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to this Statute. Such
review may include, but is not limited to, the list of crimes contained in article 5. The
Conference shall be open to those participating in the Assembly of States Parties and on the same
conditions.
Note also that Rules can be amended at any time upon adoption by a two-thirds majority of
the members of the Assembly of States Parties. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 51.
410 Article 19(2) reads:
Challenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in article 17 or challenges
to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by: (1)An accused or a person for whom a warrant
of arrest or a summons to appear has been issued under article 58; (b) A state which has
jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has
investigated or prosecuted; or (c) A State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under
article 12.

See David Scheffer, Staying the Course with the InternationalCriminal Court, supra note 7,
at 61.
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If the Court were to review a case's admissibility immediately prior the
surrender of an indictee to the ICC, then State Parties (including the United
States) could be assured that the complementarity principle has been
thoroughly followed and the indictee's due process rights have been fully
protected up to the point of the planned surrender. It may be that an initial
admissibility review early in a case's evolution would require reevaluation
months if not years later, when the charged individual stands poised to be
surrendered to the ICC. The judges should be required to undertake that
review, either with further clarification in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence or through an amendment to Article 19(1). Adoption of a new
Rule would be the more pragmatic option. The text of the new Rule would
read as follows:
Unless there has been a referral to the Court pursuant to article 13(b) of the Statute,
the Court shall determine on its own motion pursuant to article 19(1) the admissibility
of a case in accordance with article 17 when there is a request for the surrender to the
Court of a suspect who has
411 been charged in such case with a crime falling within the
jurisdiction of the Court.
X. CONCLUSION

The fundamental question that arises with respect to the
constitutionality of the Rome Statute is if the United States can take "yes"
for an answer to the question of whether the ICC protects the due process
rights of a defendant. It would be implausible for the United States to stand
before no fewer than 108 State Parties to the ICC and argue that the ICC
fails the due process test. The collective rebuttal would be deafening.
We have sought to demonstrate the following in this article:
1. U.S. policy towards the ICC has the potential of shifting towards
a more cooperative relationship with the ICC and serious consideration
by Washington of ratification of the Rome Statute.
2. The fundamental principles of the Rome Statute reflect the
merger of common law and civil law systems but are in large part very
familiar to American attorneys and judges and compatible with U.S.
practice.
411 This was negotiated in 2000 as a U.S. proposal with respect to the draft Relationship

Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, but it was not
followed through by the Bush Administration. See Working Group on a Relationship
Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, Proposal
Submitted by the United States of America, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.17
(2000); Scheffer, Staying the Course with the InternationalCriminal Court, supra note 7, at
61-62 (describing similar wording tailored for the draft Relationship Agreement between the
International Criminal Court and the United Nations rather than as an amendment to the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as is proposed in this article).
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3. The admissibility criteria of the Rome Statute establish a regime
of complementarity that defers to U.S. jurisdiction over nationals
suspected of committing atrocity crimes within the jurisdiction of the
ICC, thus presenting the opportunity for conventional protection of
U.S. constitutional rights in a criminal trial of any such national in
U.S. courts.
4. Special non-surrender agreements entered into under Article
98(2) of the Rome Statute offer further opportunities for U.S.
investigation and prosecution of American service personnel and
officials charged with atrocity crimes, with constitutional rights
protected in trials before U.S. courts, but such agreements must be
properly drafted and interpreted to realize their full potential.
5. U.S. participation in the ICC would not contravene the Article III,
Section 1 mandate of the Constitution on the establishment of
domestic courts. The judicial power of the ICC is not that of the
United States, but rather of an independent international criminal court
with its own international legal personality and bound to no
government's direction or control. Nothing in the Constitution
requires that a treaty-based international criminal court established by
the world's governments outside of the United States be inferior to the
Supreme Court. The ICC investigates and prosecutes international
crimes of the most heinous and substantial character for purposes that,
as of October 2008, 108 governments will have determined are
essential for international justice and the deterrence of atrocity crimes.
We conclude that the Constitution does not prohibit the United States
from sharing the same objectives through use of the Article II,
Section 1 treaty power to build a uniquely-conceived international
court. Ratification of the Rome Statute would not implicate the Article
III, Section 1 power to establish domestic courts.
6. While it remains important to recognize that in constitutional
practice not all crimes committed in the United States by U.S. citizens
in fact have warranted trials in Article III courts, we do not seek to
avoid the Sixth Amendment requirement that "the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.... " Where
an atrocity crime is committed in the United States, and the alleged
perpetrator is in the country, the United States should exercise its
complementarity right under the Rome Statute to prosecute such
individual before a U.S. criminal court and thus fully satisfy the Sixth
Amendment requirement. If in the extreme case such individual is
ultimately surrendered to the ICC to stand trial, he or she will have
been investigated by U.S. law enforcement authorities and, if merited,
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prosecuted under Sixth Amendment criteria. For the ICC to determine
that the United States had somehow failed the complementarity criteria
and thus triggered the surrender obligation to the ICC would be an
extraordinary decision, and one the United States would be at greatest
risk of triggering if the Congress fails to amend the federal criminal
code and the military code to fully incorporate the atrocity crimes
which frame the subject matter jurisdiction of the Rome Statute.
7. Nonetheless, the United States routinely extradites or transfers
individuals, including U.S. citizens, to non-Article III criminal courts
in foreign countries pursuant to extradition treaties and Status of
Forces Agreements entered into with foreign governments. The
Constitution does not preclude the United States from a) entering an
international agreement (such as an extradition treaty or a SOFA) to
provide for the criminal trial in a foreign court of a U.S. national who
has committed a crime abroad (including a crime partially committed
in the United States) even if that court's procedures fail to meet all
U.S. constitutional standards, or b) enforcing the judgment of a foreign
court even if it lacked some U.S. constitutional guarantees of due
process. Both practices lend credence to what would be expected of
the United States as a State Party to the Rome Statute. The fact that
the United States was so instrumental in the creation of the ICC and
the drafting of the ICC's constitutional documents suggests that the
relatively low bar established in U.S. courts for enforcement of
judgments by various foreign criminal courts as well as a robust U.S.
extradition practice that refuses to probe the due process standards of
foreign criminal courts, including those prosecuting extradited U.S.
citizens, makes the highly sophisticated structure of the ICC and its
body of due process rights acceptable on constitutional grounds.
8. The Define and Punish Clause of the Constitution enables
Congress to establish non-Article III courts and tribunals to punish
offenses against the law of nations, which atrocity crimes so qualify as
and can be so defined by the Congress pursuant to this constitutional
power.
9. The constitutional right to a jury trial is not absolute and would
depend on a variety of factors regarding the identity, whether military
or civilian, of the alleged perpetrator, the place where the atrocity
crime was committed, whether the U.S. government was seeking to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen located abroad,
a failure by U.S. prosecutors and courts to properly exercise
complementarity rights, and a resulting determination by ICC judges
that the individual must be surrendered to the ICC for trial. The
complementarity principle encourages using national courts,
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particularly if they are functioning and open for business, and thus trial
by jury would be available for any U.S. citizen who is a civilian and
physically drawn into the personal jurisdiction of a federal court. This
fundamental but peculiar attribute of common law trials-the jury-is
not a constitutionally-required element of a criminal trial before a
foreign court and it would not be a required feature of an international
criminal court, located outside the United States as an independent
treaty-based court, and which the U.S. government would join under
the Constitution pursuant to its treaty power and the Define and Punish
Clause.
10. Fundamental due process rights are protected by the Rome
Statute. With the exception of the right to trial by jury, which itself is
limited, the ICC would provide a U.S. defendant with essentially the
same due process rights as enjoyed in U.S. courts and more protection
than would typically be accorded by a foreign court to which a U.S.
citizen could be extradited pursuant to an extradition treaty.
11. The Constitution does not include any express grant of official
immunity for atrocity crimes committed by its highest officials.
Absolute immunity is only granted under federal law for civil
damages, although the test case has not arisen which would confirm or
deny the immunity of the President from criminal prosecution.
Impeachment proceedings are available as an initial remedy to hold the
President and other high officials responsible for criminal actions.
Implementing legislation for ratification of the Rome Statute could
explicitly deny the highest officials any criminal immunity defense for
the commission of atrocity crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the
ICC.
The declarations, understandings, and provisos we have recommended
in connection with U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute, as well as other
legislative initiatives and implementing legislation, particularly with respect
to amending the federal criminal and military codes to incorporate the full
range of atrocity crimes found within ICC jurisdiction, would establish a
sound basis for U.S. participation in the ICC in accordance with
constitutional law and practice.

